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Plaintiff-appellant United Park City Mines Company ("United Park") submits this
Reply Brief in its appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing
United Park's Amended Complaint against defendants-appellees Atlantic Richfield Company
("ARCO"), successor to The Anaconda Company ("Anaconda"); ASARCO, INC. ("ASARCO");
Greater Park City Company ("GPCC"), and its parent, Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc.
("AMOT"); Royal Street Land Company, Deer Valley Resort Company, Royal Street of
Utah and Royal Street Development Company, Inc. (collectively "Royal Street"); Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York ("Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of Philadelphia
("Fidelity"), and their wholly owned subsidiaries Greater Properties, Inc. ("GPI"), and
Park Properties, Inc. ("PPI") (collectively "Morgan-Fidelity"); and intervenor-appellee
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo").
INTRODUCTION
United Park's First Amended Complaint arises out of two sets of complicated
agreements executed in 1971 and 1975 and involves numerous claims and parties. The
1971 Resort Agreements created GPCC, with United Park selling to it the Park City Ski
Resort, including all its facilities and personal property, some 4,000 acres of prime
development property and valuable water rights for the discounted price of $6 million
payable over time, and leasing to it nearly 6,000 acres for ski runs for nominal
consideration. In return United Park received the right to participate in the growth of
the Park City Ski Resort as GPCC's major shareholder and senior secured creditor. The
1975 Resort Agreements restructured GPCC, profoundly altering the ownership interests
in GPCC's valuable assets, solely at the expense of United Park. United Park continued
to sell its properties and water rights for the discounted 1971 prices but with further
extended payments—even though defendants valued the development properties alone at
nearly $40 million, the skiing operations were worth more than $15 million, and the water
rights over $2 million.

United Park gave away its major equity interest in GPCC for

1

nothing and extended the Ski Leases on its land for another forty years for no significant
change in the already nominal consideration.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Anaconda (now ARCO)1 and ASARCO, Inc.,
United Park's controlling shareholders in 1975, caused United Park to give away for
grossly inadequate consideration its valuable interests in Park City skiing operations,
development properties and water rights to protect their interests in Park City Ventures,
a mining joint venture. The Amended Complaint alleges that Anaconda and ASARCO thus
breached their fiduciary duties to United Park and its outside shareholders, and that the
other defendants either breached their own fiduciary duties to United Park or aided and
abetted the breaches of the others by overreaching to the detriment of United Park. In
addition to the fiduciary duty claims, United Park alleges that United Park is entitled to
reformation of the Water Agreement and the Ski Leases, that GPCC and Royal Street
have breached certain terms of the contracts between the parties and that GPCC has
trespassed upon United Park's property.
Almost immediately after the Amended Complaint was filed, Anaconda and
ASASRCO moved to disqualify United Park's counsel amd obtained a stay of discovery
until November 1989.

The very order that lifted the stay established the briefing

schedule for defendants' summary judgment motions, filed three weeks later. Defendants'
motions were inherently fact-specific and based on grounds that court after court has
held are particularly suited for jury determination. The district court purported to find
no genuine issue of material fact as to any of United Park's claims, even though this
Court had recently emphasized that such "close calls are for juries, not judges, to make.11
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989).
United Park's opening brief establishes that the facts are not even a "close call,"
and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Defendants attempt to

1

For consistency and ease of reference, "Anaconda" refers to both Anaconda and

ARCO.
2

support the district court's findings, but simply prove the existence of numerous disputed
issues of fact, Le., whether Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park or directed
the actions of its Board; whether the 1975 Resort Agreements were fair and in the best
interest of United Park; whether defendants breached fiduciary duties or knowingly
participated in breaches of fiduciary duty; whether defendants and the United Park Board
misrepresented or concealed material facts from outside shareholders; whether United
Park's outside directors were independent, fully informed of all material facts and willing
to assert claims on behalf of United Park and its outside shareholders; whether United
Park should have discovered any fiduciary duty breaches before 1985; whether United
Park is entitled to reformation of the Water Agreement and Ski Leases; and whether
GPCC or Royal Street have breached certain terms of the 1975 Resort Agreements.
Defendants include two additional attacks in an attempt to convince this Court
that there are no genuine issues of material fact. First, they assert that United Park's
opposition to defendants' summary judgment motions rested solely on "inadmissible
statements" in United Park's affidavits, but the affidavits are admissible and in any event
the great majority of facts supporting United Park's claims do not rely on them. Second,
defendants contend that United Park has had sufficient opportunity for discovery, when
they have effectively precluded any discovery since the filing of the Amended Complaint
and the previously conducted discovery was not directed at the issues raised in their
motions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
STRIKE UNITED PARK'S AFFIDAVITS.
The district court correctly denied defendants' motions to strike four of six

affidavits submitted by United Park as violations of the hearsay, parol evidence and best
evidence rules.

(R. 7859-62)

These included the affidavits of David Bernolfo, the

current president of United Park, Edwin L. Osika, Jr., the current secretary, Louis
Callister, an attorney who previously represented United Park in this litigation, and
3

Harold Taylor, former mayor of Park City and head of real estate sales for GPCC. Royal
Street, joined by AMOT and GPCC, again argue that the affidavits should be stricken to
convince this Court that the district court "properly granted summary judgment because
affidavits that contain virtually no admissible evidence create no genuine issues of
material fact." Royal Street ("R.S.") Br. at 35.
Defendants1 motion to strike was groundless because the affidavits clearly were
admissible.

They either summarized documents and other evidence submitted to the

district court as exhibits, were based on personal knowledge, or were offered for a
purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted.

Equally important, the great

majority of facts that contradict the district court's findings are not based on United
Park's affidavits, but on the exhibits, deposition testimony, and other evidence in the
record. Even if a particular statement were inadmissible, the proper remedy would be
to strike the statement, not the entire affidavit. Royal Street does not identify a single
fact in United Park's brief that relies solely on an allegedly inadmissible statement in an
affidavit.

For the reasons stated below, striking part of any affidavit would have no

material effect on United Park's appeal.
A.

United Park's Affidavits Are Properly Admissible.

Royal Street asserts that portions of United Park's affidavits violate the hearsay,
best evidence and parol evidence rules because they summarize the agreements, other
documents, and the deposition record. R.S. Br. at 25-27. These objections are frivolous
because United Park submitted the documents as exhibits to the district court. (R. 48686777) "Best evidence" is not a proper objection when the underlying records are before
the court.

See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1983),

cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).

Parol evidence is admissible "when the original

consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the evidence sought from them is only the general result
of the whole." Utah Code Ann. §78-25-16(5).

4

United Park's affidavits were properly admissible as summaries of the record
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which provides that the ucontents of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation."
hearsay, and need not be based on personal knowledge.

Such summaries are not

See, e.g., Moore v. Johns-

Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Hughes, 710 F.Supp.
1520, 1524 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
Significantly, Royal Street does hot attempt to prove any summary inaccurate. 2
Royal Street merely complains, for example, that many paragraphs in the Bernolfo
affidavit "purport to describe in minute detail the provisions of the 1971 and 1975
agreements and related documents, as well as editorializing about the rights and
obligations of the parties." In a footnote, Royal Street argues rhetorically that "if the
only purpose of the affidavits was to 'summarize' the record, one wonders why they were
filed at all." R.S. Br. at 27 & n.6. The answer is straightforward: to summarize relevant
documents, deposition testimony, and other evidence too voluminous and complex to
review in the original and to clarify the facts and issues. That is the purpose of Utah
R. Evid. 1006 and the exception to the parol evidence rule codified at Utah Code Ann.
§78-25-16(5).
Royal Street also makes foundation and hearsay objections to portions of United
Park's affidavits addressing United Park's investigation and discovery of its claims,
including the "detailed recitations of Mr. Bernolfo's discussions with a variety of people"
in paragraphs 68-101 of his affidavit. R.S. Br. at 30. These discussions, however, bear
directly on the issues raised by defendants' statute of limitations motions — including
defendants' concealment of material facts, United Park's knowledge of its claims, and

2

Even if Royal Street made the attempt, the showing would go to the weight of the
summary, not its admissibility. See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Bendectin
Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212, 1224-26 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd., 857 F.2d
790 (6th Cir. 1988), cert, denied sub, nom., 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
5

its diligence in pursuing them,

Bernolfo's detailed discussion of United Park f s

investigation — all of which he conducted personally or directed United Park employees
to conduct — establishes that defendants continued to conceal information even after
Bernolfo became president in 1985, that United Park exerted reasonable if not
exceptional diligence to discover its claims, and that United Park could not have
discovered the fiduciary duty claims until after formal discovery on United Park's initial
complaint.
point.

Royal Street's attempt to strike these paragraphs as "hearsay" misses the

See, e^g., Durfey v. Board of Education, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979) (evidence

offered for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted is not excludable
as hearsay)- 3
B.

Striking Portions Of United Park's Affidavits Would Have No Effect On
United Park's Appeal.

Even if any statement in an affidavit were inadmissible, the remedy would be to
strike the statement, not the entire affidavit. See, e.g., Lee v. National Life Assur. Co.,
632 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1980). Royal Street does not identify a single fact in United
Park's brief that would be affected.

The great majority of facts that support United

Park's appeal do not rely on the affidavits, but on the documentary record, deposition
testimony, and defendants' admissions.4
Virtually none of the facts that contradict the district court's statute of
limitations findings, for example,, rely on the affidavits.

United Park establishes

3

Royal Street objects to the discussions in the Bernolfo and Callister affidavits of
their meetings with former director S.N. Cornwall. See R.S. Br. at 30-31. Cornwall
told Bernolfo and Callister that "he had been told by GPCC officers that the United Park
properties had no value in 1975," that the ski resort was losing money, and that GPCC
faced bankruptcy if United Park did not agree to the proposal. (R. 4802-03; 4786-87)
But the meetings are evidence of matters other than the truth of the statements. The
meetings occur shortly before United Park filed its initial complaint, and explain why
United Park believed that the other defendants had withheld essential information from
Anaconda and ASARCO. It was not until after formal discovery began that United Park
learned that Anaconda and ASARCO had known this information.
4

AMOT also argues that the affidavits are insufficient to create genuine issues of
fact, AMOT Br. at 16, but none of the facts that United Park cites in its brief, or infra
at 35-39, to establish AMOT's liability rely on the affidavits.
6

Anaconda's and ASARCO's control of United Park and their breaches of fiduciary duty
through the public record (including stock ownership and election of employees as
directors), the deposition testimony of former Anaconda official Clark Wilson and others,
and internal correspondence and memoranda. United Park also establishes defendants'
concealment of material facts through deposition testimony and the documentary record,
including the minutes of the May 27, 1975 annual shareholder's meeting and the October
2, 1975 special meeting, the September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement, the internal GPCC
memoranda valuing United Park's properties, the Gartner letter, and the letters and
telegrams sent to the few shareholders who raised questions about the 1975 Resort
Agreements.
If Royal Street really believed that the affidavits were crucial, Royal Street would
have chosen an example that strikes at the heart of United Park's appeal. But Royal
Street chooses paragraph 40 from the Bernolfo affidavit, which summarizes the terms of
the 1971 and 1975 Resort Agreements and provides general background.

Royal Street

does not dispute the accuracy of any statement in paragraph 40. Most significant, Royal
Street has admitted or asserted most of the facts in paragraph 40 to which it objects. 5

5

For example, Royal Street objects to Bernolfo's statement in paragraph 40 that
[u]nder the 1971 Land Agreement, United Park agreed to sell 4,200 acres of real
property suitable for commercial, condominium and subdivision development, together with
the resort base facilities, golf course, and other resort improvements and personal
property of the existing resort for the sum of $5,400,000." R.S. Br. at 28-9. But Royal
Street states in its brief that in "February 1971, GPCC, United Park and RSDC entered"
the Land Purchase Agreement, by which "United Park agreed to sell GPCC approximately
4,200 acres of real property suitable for commercial, condominium and subdivision
development, together with the base facilities, golf course, other resort improvements
and the personal property of the existing resort operations for the sum of $5,574,000,
payable over time." Id. at 12.
Royal Street objects to Bernolfo's statement, "due to GPCC's defaults, United Park
was entitled to take all of that property back," because it "is a legal question." Id. at
28-29. But Royal Street represented to the district court that "United Park had the
opportunity to take back the resort property but refused to do so, insisting that what it
wanted was to get paid on the contracts it had entered into in 1971." (R. 4133)
Royal Street does not challenge Bernolfo's statement that United Park's properties
had increased greatly in value, which cites the internal Robert Wells memorandum dated
April 19, 1975 valuing United Park's properties. But Royal Street does challenge
Bernolfo's statement that the Wells memorandum "was apparently prepared for the GPCC
restructuring discussions," arguing that the "reason a memorandum was 'apparently'
(continued...)
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Royal Street presents no basis for striking the affidavits.

Those affidavits,

together with the documentary record that includes the vast majority of facts upon which
United Park relies, establish significant disputed issues of fact precluding summary
judgment.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF UNITED PARK'S RULE 56(f) AFFIDAVIT WHICH
DEMONSTRATED UNITED PARK'S NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY.
Defendants attempt to convince this Court that United Park had sufficient

opportunity for discovery.

Certain defendants suggest that United Park engaged in

massive discovery over several years, see A&A Br. at 6-7, while others suggest that
United Park never submitted a single discovery request. See R.S. Br. at 22.6 Defendants
greatly distort the discovery record in this litigation, which in accurate context
establishes that initial discovery efforts were focused, by agreement among counsel, on
the fraud and racketeering allegations in the initial Complaint.

Defendants have

precluded discovery since United Park filed its Amended Complaint in June 1988, and
United Park has had no opportunity for discovery directed to the issues raised by their
dispositive motions.
In May 1986, United Park through its law firm Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, filed
the initial Complaint which named Royal Street and GPCC as defendants and alleged that
they defrauded United Park and its controlling shareholders and committed racketeering.
The initial Complaint was based on facts new management and the law firm had been able

5

(... continued)
prepared is . . . speculation." Id. at 29. United Park, however, was entitled to that
reasonable inference on summary judgment. More importantly, Royal Street's objection
is a red herring. The memorandum is significant not for the reason it was prepared, but
because it valued United Park's properties at $37.8 million, including the Deer
Valley/Lake Flat properties at more than $15 million, when the Proxy Statement told
United Park's outside shareholders that the property values were unknown.
6

Royal Street incorrectly claims it had provided United Park the opportunity to
inspect boxes of documents which United Park failed to inspect. R.S. Br. at 22. MorganFidelity also incorrectly claims that United Park did not request documents from Fidelity,
Royal Street or AMOT. M-F Br. at 18.
8

to learn through investigation, but without the benefit of any discovery. Royal Street
and GPCC filed motions to dismiss, which were denied by Judge David Dee in December
1986, The deposition of Clark Wilson, an Anaconda official who had been president and
a director of United Park, was then begun but not completed.
In February 1987, United Park retained current counsel, who investigated the
possibility of pursuing productive settlement discussions before embarking on the
extensive discovery that would be required. Counsel for Royal Street and GPCC indicated
that the fraud and racketeering claims made negotiations difficult, and that they believed
those claims unfounded.

Accordingly, counsel agreed to focus discovery on these

allegations, particularly whether Royal Street or GPCC had misrepresented and concealed
material information from United Park and its controlling shareholders Anaconda and
ASARCO during the restructuring of GPCC.7 Pursuant to this understanding, a number of
depositions were taken and certain documents voluntarily produced, including documents
obtained from Anaconda and ASARCO by Royal Street's counsel reflecting their
knowledge of and participation in the restructuring of GPCC.8

7

See R. 7969 at 238-40 (transcript testimony of David K. Watkiss at a hearing on
the motions of Anaconda and ASARCO to disqualify Watkiss & Campbell from representing
United Park). Watkiss testified that in early 1987, he had discussions with counsel for
GPCC and Royal Street about possible settlement negotiations, their claim that their
clients had not misled United Park's Board concerning the 1975 Resort Agreements, and
that it was now well known that there had been complaints in 1975 that the Board was
not protecting the company's interests. ARCO and ASARCO and Royal Street select
certain words from this testimony about counsel's knowledge of facts in 1987 to
incorrectly claim that counsel admitted that it was common knowledge in 1975 that the
United Park Board had not protected the company's interests. See A&A Br. at 49 and
R.S. Br. at 48. While this testimony may be subject to selective interpretation or
distortion, the facts are not—Anaconda's and ASARCOfs control of United Park was
common knowledge in 1975, but their failure to protect United Park's interests was then
only known to them, their representatives on United Park's Board and the other
defendants.
8

Royal Street well knew that United Park had been controlled by Anaconda and
ASARCO. Royal Street had negotiated significant portions of the 1971 Resort Agreements
in the New York offices of Anaconda (R. 7938 at 10-11), and in 1973, Royal Street and
Morgan-Fidelity had approached Anaconda and ASARCO about the possibility of purchasing
their controlling interest in United Park. (R. 6623) Royal Street's counsel, in arguing
Royal Street's motion to dismiss the first Complaint, informed the court that Anaconda
and ASARCO were "the mining companies which controlled United Park at that time."
(continued...)
9

As a result of the facts learned through this discovery, United Park prepared an
Amended Complaint which added as defendants Anaconda, ASARCO, AMOT and MorganFidelity, and asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims instead of the fraud and
racketeering claims in its initial complaint. Before any responsive pleadings were filed,
Anaconda and ASARCO moved to disqualify United Park's counsel and obtained a stay of
all discovery that continued until November, 1989.

The order which lifted the stay

established the briefing schedule for the "dispositive motions11 that defendants filed three
weeks later. See M-F Br. Add. 9.
The Affidavit of David K. Watkiss, United Park's counsel, specified United Park's
needed discovery, including depositions of officials of Anaconda and ASARCO who were
United Park Board members, Anaconda and ASARCO' officers to whom these Board
members reported, and Anaconda and ASARCO officers who appeared to have participated
in critical decisions concerning the 1975 Resort Agreements.

(R. 4862-67)

Several

defendants argue that additional discovery would be irrelevant or cumulative, because it
can only prove that United Park's stockholders and directors knew more about the 1975
Resort Agreements, but not less. See A&A Br. at 68. That assertion is obviously false,
because these depositions, together with documentary discovery from ARCO and ASARCO,
are needed in order to fully respond to the statute of limitation issues and to ARCO and
ASARCO's claims that they did not control United Park.

United Park also needs to

depose Harold Steele, Wheeler Sears, and perhaps Sears 1 counsel, Steven Leshin, in order
to further establish that these directors could not or would not discover or assert United
Park's claims. United Park needs to depose Jerome Gartner to determine why he did not
follow up on his letter to the United Park Board and what John B. M. Place, Chairman
of Anaconda, said to him. Also needed is the deposition of Tully Friedman of Salomon

8

(...continued)
(R. 7922 at 24) Even Anaconda was then acknowledging this control. (R. 7930 at 104)
10

Brothers who had studied GPPC's financial condition and had proposed a number of
alternative solutions to preserve GPCC and protect its shareholders interests.
Some defendants argue that United Park should have obtained any needed
discovery after the extended stay was finally lifted during the four-month schedule
established for filing the extensive memoranda and documents addressing defendants'
motions and for argument.

The impossibility of arranging a schedule with all of the

defendants for a number of out-of-state depositions and taking these depositions while
concurrently preparing a detailed 185 page response to defendants' voluminous memoranda
and appendices and preparing to argue the motions establishes the spuriousness of this
claim.
United Park reasonably and timely raised its need for additional discovery when
it filed its Rule 56(f) affidavit with its opposition to defendants' motions. The district
court abused its discretion in granting defendants motions before permitting United Park
adequate discovery. The judgment should be reversed. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311,
312-15 (Utah 1984); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 19394 (Utah 1977).
III.

ANACONDA AND ASARCO CONTROLLED UNITED PARK AND BREACHED THEIR
FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO UNITED PARK'S OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS.
Despite the undisputed evidence in the record, the admissions of an Anaconda

official, and the testimony of other participants in the 1975 Resort Agreements, Anaconda
and ASARCO argue repeatedly that United Park "submitted no factual basis" that
Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park, A&A Br. at 22, and that United Park
"cannot hold ARCO and ASARCO responsible for the conduct of board members just
because ARCO and ASARCO caused the directors to be elected." Id. at 59. The district
court held that "no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding [United Park's]
allegations against ARCO and ASARCO" (R. 7855,115), even though Anaconda and ASARCO
did not seek summary judgment that they owed no fiduciary duties to United Park or that
there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether those duties were breached. To the
11

extent that their contentions about control can be now construed to support the district
court's finding, however, the evidence is as follows.
Between 1970 and 1985, Anaconda and ASARCO owned 31% of United Park's shares.
The remaining 69% of United Park's; shares were widely dispersed among more than 5,000
shareholders (R. 4736-37), which gave Anaconda and ASARCO effective

control.

Anaconda and ASARCO did not, as they would have this Court believe, merely "cause" the
directors to be elected.

Each company elected two of its own employees to United

Park's seven-member board.

Clark Wilson was asked by his superiors at Anaconda to

become a director of United Park shortly after he became manager of Anaconda's
operations for Utah, Nevada and California.

(R. 7930 at 12-13, 16; R. 7932 at 371)

Wilson also became United Park's president and supervised its day to day activities from
his Anaconda office. (R. 7930 at 49; 7944 at 22)

Between 1969 and 1981, Wilson

submitted monthly reports regarding United Park mining and resort activities to his
superiors that were not provided to anyone outside Anaconda. (R. 7930 at 23) Wilson
always reported to his superiors at Anaconda, and obtained approval from Anaconda and
ASARCO before presenting a transaction to United Park's board. Id. at 48-50.
In late 1974, Anaconda and ASARCO decided to get United Park out of the ski
resort and land development business, and to protect Park City Ventures, the joint
venture they had formed to mine United Park's properties. 9

9

Wilson admitted that

Anaconda and ASARCO formed Park City Ventures in 1970. As United Park's
controlling shareholders, Anaconda and ASARCO caused United Park to lease to Park
City Ventures all of its mining property and equipment. Under the lease, Anaconda and
ASARCO were to receive two-thirds of the net mining profits. (R. 6291-93) Because
of their holding in Park City Ventures, Anaconda's and ASARCO's interests in United Park
differed from the interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7954 at 110; 7930
at 105, 112) With the Park City Ventures Mining Lease and the 1971 Resort Agreements,
United Park was transformed into a holding company with only an office manager and two
secretaries. (R. 4744) United Park was wholly dependent on Park City Ventures, operated
by Anaconda and ASARCO, and on GPCC, operated by Royal Street. Wilson conceded
that, with respect to United Park's surface assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO
differed from the interests of United Park's other shareholders. (R. 7930 at 112)
Anaconda and ASARCO refused to allow United Park to preserve its equity in GPCC or
its interest in the resort's property and other assets, even though they knew that the
value of the resort and the real property that United Park had contributed to GPCC had
(continued...)
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Anaconda and ASARCO controlled United Park, and that it was their "policy" to "get out
of the resort business" because their first interest was mining.

(R. 7930 at 104-5)

Wilson testified that Anaconda was very anxious to protect the mineral property, and
believed that a threatened bankruptcy of GPCC could have a negative impact on the Park
City Ventures mining lease.

(R. 7932 at 474-76)

Anaconda's principal goal was to

protect the mining lease, and Wilson's first duty to Anaconda was to make sure that
United Park did not do anything during any restructuring of GPCC that would interfere
with the mining lease. (R. 7930 at 104-5, 112; 7932 at 473) "[A]nything that we thought
we could arrive at for the interests Anaconda and ASARCO represented had to be cleared
in New York." (R. 7932 at 411)
Other parties to the 1975 Resort Agreements confirmed that Anaconda and ASARCO
dictated United Park's position.

Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative,

testified that Anaconda and ASARCO "had zero interest in the future of the ski area,"
but were "very, very serious about trying to protect their mining rights." (R. 7954 at
109-10)

Butler testified that their focus was almost exclusively on "mining and the

protection of the mining interests" and "what they had coming under the old 1971
agreements." Id. Anaconda and ASARCO did not attempt to obtain anything more than
that (R. 7954 at 110-11), because "they basically wanted to protect their mine and
protect their principal." (R. 7954 at 112) Consequently, Morgan-Fidelity "never really
had any cause to negotiate very much" with Anaconda and ASARCO. Id. Donald Prell,
Unionamerica's representative, testified that United Park did not want to wind up getting
back the resort property because they "had the subsurface, the mines that they wanted,
obviously, to keep." (R. 7921 at 49) The 1975 Resort Agreements were completed in May
and June 1975 consistent with the position of Anaconda and ASARCO, and the parties then

9

(... continued)
increased greatly since 1971. In a memorandum to the Anaconda files dated March 26,
1975, for example, Wilson wrote that the "value of the properties is now much greater
than in the [1971] UPC contract, perhaps 10 times." (R. 6467)
13

performed many of the terms months before the October 7, 1975 special shareholder
meeting,10

They did so, of courses because they knew that Anaconda and ASARCO

controlled United Park and thus treated shareholder approval as a formality.
These facts establish control even as Anaconda and ASARCO define it in their
brief. See A&A Br. at 22. Under Delaware law, United Park's place of incorporation,
shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders if they affirmatively direct the
affairs of the corporation or dictate the terms of a corporate transaction.

See, e.g.,

Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 1.19, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971) (control implies a "direction
of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling"); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa
Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1977) (controlling shareholder owes fiduciary duty when it
controls transaction and fixes its terms); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (shareholder owes fiduciary duty if it exercises control over the
business affairs of a corporation). Despite the pleas of Anaconda and ASARCO to the
contrary, they unquestionably controlled United Park and directed its position in the 1975
Resort Agreements. United Park can "hold them responsible for the conduct of board
members" whom they directed.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY THE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION.
United Park has presented compelling evidence that, contrary to the district

court's findings, United Park could not discover or assert its fiduciary duty claims before
independent management assumed control in 1985.

United Park established that

defendants concealed and misrepresented material facts from United Park's outside

10

In late spring 1975, Royal Street surrendered control and management of GPCC to
AMOT, which infused $675,000 into GPCC. (R. 7940 at 86; 5940) Anaconda and ASARCO
caused United Park to make the undisclosed sale of valuable real property in Deer Valley
to Royal Street at prices well below market value. (R. 4753-54) Unionamerica received
the property deeds and contract rights even before the Agreements were signed, and sold
or liquidated some of the property during the summer of 1975. (R. 6626; 4753; 7953 at
97)
14

shareholders that prevented discovery of the fiduciary duty claims. United Park ("U.P.")
Br. at 34-44. United Park also established that United Park's outside directors either
could not assert claims on behalf of United Park, because defendants concealed material
facts from them, or would not do so, because they were directed and controlled by
defendants, had conflicts of interest that precluded them from asserting such claims, or
were implicated in the wrongdoing. U.P. Br. at 44-46.
Defendants urge this Court to focus on a few selected "facts" and to ignore all
other facts and inferences to which United Park was entitled.

Defendants argue that

these "facts" establish as a matter of law that United Park's outside shareholders and
directors had "notice" of United Park's fiduciary duty claims. At the very most these
facts establish disputed issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
Defendants also attempt to impose a legal burden on United Park that has no application
here, but even if the burden applies, United Park has met it. Finally, several defendants
reassert the fall-back argument that United Park should have discovered its claims in
1982, after Wheeler Sears became president of United Park, even though defendants
abandoned this argument before this district court. 11

11

Morgan-Fidelity, GPCC and AMOT also argue that the discovery rule does not
apply to them because there is no evidence that they engaged in concealment. M-F Br.
at 24-26; GPCC Br. at 33; AMOT Br. at 17. The argument is wrong because the discovery
rule applies to all breaches of fiduciary duty, whether or not there is concealment. See,
e.g., Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979) (where "there is a
fiduciary relationship, such as between corporate officers and a stockholder, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should discover, that there is a wrong"). United Park and MorganFidelity were co-shareholders in GPCC. Co-shareholders in a closely held corporation owe
each other the same duties of loyalty and care that partners owe each other. See U.P.
Br. at 60 & n. 22. Defendants have never disputed this proposition. Furthermore, if the
discovery rule applies to all breaches of fiduciary duty, it surely applies to claims for
aiding and abetting those breaches, whether or not there is any concealment. Any other
rule would be nonsensical, because it would require United Park to discover the aiding
and abetting before United Park could reasonably discover the underlying breaches of
fiduciary duty. In In re Rexplore, Inc. Securities Litigation, 685 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. CaL
1988), the court rejected "the view that each defendant must independently engage in
affirmative acts of fraudulent concealment in order for the doctrine of equitable tolling
to apply to that defendant" because it would "require plaintiffs to engage in a due
diligence inquiry that they could never reasonably know necessary." The court adopted
"the view that once the plaintiff has been lulled into inaction by the fraudulent
(continued...)
15

A.

Defendants Misrepresented and Concealed Facts from Shareholders that
Precluded Discovery of the Fiduciary Duty Claims.

Defendants argue that United Park's shareholders had knowledge of the fiduciary
duty claims because the disclosures at the May 27, 1975 annual meeting and September
2, 1975 Proxy Statement provided an "outline" of the 1975 Resort Agreements, M-F Br.
at 30, or "disclosed the transactions to the stockholders,, describing what United Park was
receiving and what United Park was giving up in the transaction."

A&A Br. at 43.

Defendants acknowledge that "[c]ertainly some details were omitted from the proxy
statement,"

R.S. Br. at 48, but argue that the "fact that additional details were not

included in the proxy is irrelevant," A&A Br. at 43.
Among the "irrelevant details" the Proxy Statement failed to disclose were the
values of the undeveloped properties that United Park was conveying. Defendants had
valued the development properties at nearly $37.8 million six months earlier, including
the Deer Valley and Lake Flat properties alone at more than $15 million. (R. 6529) No
other "detail" could have been more important to a shareholder's decision to approve the
agreements.

Without any factual support, Anaconda and ASARCO make the incredible

statement that they could not conceal the value of those properties because they were
"generally known." A&A Br. at 45. This in no way explains why the Proxy Statement
affirmatively misrepresented to shareholders that United Park "does not know the current
market value of these property interests." (R. 6666)
Equally important, the Proxy Statement concealed or misrepresented other
"irrelevant details" crucial to an understanding of the fairness of the agreements- The
Proxy Statement did not disclose the increasing profitability of the ski resort operations,
or that the ski revenues alone made the resort itself then worth as much as $15 million.
(R. 4765) It did not disclose the large values of the properties or assets that the other

n

(...continued)
concealment of one defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all the
defendants." 685 F. Supp. at 1138.
16
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f; 57 ; 6374) The misrepresentation and omissions of these "in elevant details," together

C : r lpany's income or assets" (R. 6667), were intended to keep I Jnited Park's shareholders

of the resort business and had no inb'rost in protecting I Jnited Park's interest in the
resoi I: pi opertie s
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miniIiK I<•.ise and wanted nothing to

interfere with it.' 2
Defendants argue that the Gartner letter "refutes" any allegation,, of concealment.

the special meeting were '"'advised that the fairness of the transaction was being

at 46. But those eighteen shareholders were never shown the letter not told lis specific
allegations. Those shareholders were told that the letter was a, "crank letter," a "diatribe

all details,"'

(R. 5940)

Contrary to defendants 1 assei tion, see A&A Mr » ;it 1/, thnso

shareholders had no "duty" to ask to see the letter , but wei e entitled to rely on I he
statements of till: mi, *ii fidi iciaries v I'l: :i„c ::: • a *d them complete candor

\.MCO',
:.;., A;AR^ » aigu< M.-.t "silence is not enough to to] 1 the statute of
limitations," but requires "some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and
prevent inquiry." A&A Br, at 43. Silence by fiduciaries, however, is an affirmative act,
because a fiduciary has an affirmative duty to speak. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v.
Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 1971); Dymm v. Cahill, 730 F. Supp.
1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), In any event, the discussion at the annual meeting, the preparation
and dissemination of the misleading Proxy Statement, and the reassurances to shareholders
before, during and after the special meeting, are all wrongful affirmative acts intended
to exclude suspicion and, prevent inquiry.

17
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Defendants also argue that the Gartner letter, and the letters from a few other
shareholders, are undisputed evidence that those shareholders had knowledge of the
fiduciary duty claims.

See, e.g., R.S. Br. at 44-46; A&A Br. at 46.

But Gartner's

knowledge cannot be attributed to United Park because the knowledge of a single
shareholder cannot be imputed to the corporation.13 Neither can Gartner's knowledge be
attributed to other shareholders, because they are not held to the same standard as a
New York securities lawyer who conducted "hours of intensive research" in the
"incomplete set of documents" at the New York Stock Exchange and SEC offices. And
the fact that a few other shareholders questioned the agreements does not mean that
they had knowledge of the fiduciary duty claims.14 Defendants argue that these letters

13

Anaconda and ASARCO wrongly assert that defendants "do not have to show that
all stockholders" had knowledge, but only that "one independent stockholder" had
knowledge. A&A Br. at 46. Morgan-Fidelity correctly state that defendants must prove
that United Park's "class of shareholders" had knowledge of wrongdoing. M-F. Br. at 27.
As a general matter, knowledge of all shareholders is imputable to the corporation, but
knowledge of a single shareholder is not (except for a sole or controlling shareholder).
See, e.g., White v. FDIC, 122 F.2d 770, 775 (4th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 316 U.S. 672
(1942) (knowledge of all stockholders is knowledge of the corporation and triggers the
statute of limitations, but "knowledge of a single stockholder" would not be imputed to
the corporation and the right of a single stockholder to seek a remedy would, of itself,
not set the statute of limitations running); Solomon v. Cedar Acres East, Inc., 317 A.2d
283, 284 (Pa. 1974) (knowledge of single stockholder with a minority interest cannot be
imputed to corporation); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F.Supp. 432, 441-2 (N.D. Iowa 1946)
(statute of limitations does not bar corporate derivative suit even if a particular
stockholder had knowledge of wrongdoing because the "knowledge or lack of knowledge
of an individual stockholder not connected with a corporation other than as a stockholder
is not material in considering the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim of the
corporation"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying statute of
limitations where "shareholders as a class" had knowledge of claims).
14

Precisely this argument was rejected in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286
F.Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). The shareholders
brought a derivative suit in connection with the merger of a parent and its subsidiary
effected by the controlling shareholder of each corporation. Defendants argued that the
statute of limitations had expired because the named plaintiffs had "doubts about the
advisability of the merger, . . . were acquainted with key officers of [the parent
corporation], and yet failed to make inquiries or protests against the action." 286
F.Supp. at 813. The plaintiffs, however, argued that their consent was obtained through
misleading proxy solicitations, and subsequent encouraging letters from management. Id.
at 812. They also argued that "while they doubted that the merger was good business
practice, they relied upon [the controlling shareholder's] integrity and the information
provided them by management," and that they had no reason to suspect fraud until much
later, ki. The court concluded there was "a genuine issue of fact that could be resolved
(continued...)
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if a shareholder falls to inquire, lie or she is chargeable with all facts that an inquiry
would have revealed. See A& A Br, at 47; R.S. Br. at 42. But the letters show that these
shai « sholdei s made the inqi lii j
Contrary to defendants1 assertions, the Gartner letter is not a "rough outline of
the Amended Complaint. " R S Br at 44. Fol lowing: a detailed description of 1 lie history

to postpone the special meeting and revise the Proxy Statement, which he asserted was
misleading and confusing, to set forth the fairness of the 1975 Resort Agreements. (R.

continuing to misrepresent and conceal material facts about the fairness of the
Agreements. Defendants did not, as their fiduciary duties required, disclose the value of

special meeting or revise the Proxy Statement as requested

Instead, Anaconda and

A SARCO kept: their proxies in place and directed the I Jnited Park Board to proceed with

and reassured the other shareholders that the Agreements were "complex and difficult to
understand," bi it were in their best interest

selected facts, a jury woi lid be fully entitled, if not compelled, to conclude that I Jnited
Park" s shareholders eoi lid not have di scovered the breaches of fiduciary di ity prior to

Proxy Statement, inch iding the representations that the Agreements were necessary and
would not affect United Park's Income or assets, reasonably convinced shareholders that

-*!ontinm
only at trial," and held that a "decision on this question would require us to make
difficult judgments on the amount of knowledge available to the plaintiffs and the
reasonableness of theii conduct. In sue! I circumstances, the summary judgment procedure
Is inappropriate." Id.
19

defendants were acting in their best interest; (2) that the "irrelevant details" were
intentionally omitted or misrepresented so that shareholders would believe that the
Agreements were fair and approve them; (3) that if stakeholders had a duty of inquiry,
they satisfied that duty by writing letters to United Park's Board of Directors; (4) that
in response to those inquiries, defendants continued to conceal and misrepresent the terms
of the Agreements to convince those shareholders the Agreements were fair and in their
best interest; and (5) that United Park's shareholders reasonably relied on the
representations of the directors who were their fiduciaries.

Not only are the facts

disputed, they are not even the close call that only juries should make. See Chapman,
784 P.2d at 1186.
B.

United Park's Outside Directors Could Not or Would Not Discover or Assert
Claims on Behalf of United Park.

United Park's "outside" directors could not or would not discover and assert United
Park's fiduciary duty claims.

S.N. Cornwall, Harold Steele, and Miles Romney were

selected by Anaconda and ASARCO,, (R. 7930 at 32) Anaconda and ASARCO determined
United Park's position in the restructuring, and Clark Wilson as Anaconda's officer and
president of United Park took the lead in implementing that position. (R. 7930 at 125;
and 7921 at 31) Cornwall, Lee Travis (ASARCO's officer), and Lamar Osika participated
with Wilson in the GPCC restructuring, and Cornwall drafted the 1975 Resort Agreements
that reflected the position of Anaconda and ASARCO.

(R. 7930 at 133-6)

The only

reasonable inference — and an inference to which United Park was fully entitled on
summary judgment — is that Wilson, Travis, Cornwall and Osika followed the instructions
of Anaconda and ASARCO. Wilson, Cornwall and Romney clearly acted at the direction
of Anaconda and ASARCO in connection with the special meeting. They approved the
misleading Proxy Statement, which Osika helped prepare, and received copies of the
Gartner letter.

Wilson and Cornv/all immediately reported the letter to Anaconda and

ASARCO in New York. Anaconda and ASARCO directed the United Park Board to proceed
with the special meeting. Wilson, Cornwall and Romney met with Badami and others at
20

and Cornwall then called Gartner to dissuade him from opposing the Agreements.

(R

5940; 4 759) Romney sent telegrams to Gartner and to other shareholders to dissi lade

to understand but were in their best interest

(R 7252)

Mnroovei , these three director s I: lad long standing ibi isiness

\

Anaconda <jn<i i\l > AR(X) Romney was a mining consultant. Coi nwall,

r-

.ih

..

^n

Cott law firm,, had served for many years as counsel for both Anaconda and United Park
11'1, 7930 at 32)

and had been selected as a direct or by Annromu,
restructuring, I an Cott acted as counsel I oi
Anaconda

I nil iiiiiii , I in>

i I I liu k, Royal Street, GPCC and

.

I larold Steele's bank also had longstanding bi isiness relationships with

Because they acted on the insti: uctions of Anaconda and ASARCO, and "because of
their long-standing business relationships with the corporations, United Park's outside

;» . .. i * *m ..^. i is not imputed to the corporation if the dir ectoi is not
independent o; t->e eontrolling shareholders. In Borden v. Sinskey; 530 F.2d 478 (3i d Cir.
tl i.€ stati ite of limitatic ns becai lse tl le sonti oil ling dir sctoi s I lad
concealed their breaches of fiducial y di ity from si lar el: loldei s ' I he c :>i irt rejected tl le
directors' argument that the corporation 1 lad knowledge of tl le breaches because one

. t-coit:. *,

. wipt,iti., n . ; , i ; e ^

ratified" the arouisition:-
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J;
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.
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court in MicheL->eii \. I'enney\
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limitations and iclosed I-J impute knowledge of the dii ectors where the "new directors
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were elected by the controlling . . . group, many of them were lent qualifying shares by
this group, and none of them were ever independent in any real sense." 135 F.2d at 416
n.2.
Defendants argue that United Park's outside directors could have proceeded in the
courts through a derivative suit. M-F Br. at 36-37. Numerous courts, in the context of
a derivative suit, have excused a plaintiff's failure to make demand on the board where
the directors participated in the wrongdoing or ratified the transaction.

In deHaas v.

Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970), the court excused derivative plaintiffs'

failure to make demand on the

corporation's five-member board, even though three members did not participate in the
contested transactions and had opposed the controlling shareholders in some instances.
The court stated that it was "extremely unlikely that the board of directors would have
taken action in connection with plaintiff's claims," because the three outside directors
were elected by the controlling shareholders and "had taken only a limited interest in the
corporation's affairs."

Id. at 814.

The court concluded that "while it cannot be said

that the three outside directors were wholly dominated by" the controlling shareholders,
they "were dependent" on the controlling shareholders for information and did not
"evidence that they were the kind of active and aggressive majority that would be likely
to undertake the difficult and demanding task of prosecuting a lawsuit for fraud against
those who elected them." Id. at 814. See also Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th
Cir. 1971) (excusing demand where the complaint alleged that a majority of the directors
"participated, approved of and acquiesced in said transaction and are liable therefor");
Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2nd Cir. 1955) (excusing
demand where directors and controlling shareholders were either antagonistic, adversely
interested, or involved in the transaction); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974), cert, denied sub, nom., 419 U.S.
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1048 OP74> /excusing demand where complaint allowed dial all directors "participated or
acquiesced in the IVH»II>(;S alleged and are liable therefor11).15
Milium Fidelity altempts to minimize these ronf lifts an a matter of fact. Monvm •
1^uic lily argues that tloiiiw,"" u/i"; 'IUUM

i

i |x>• .j11• in when lie '"".ijjfj have received

information thai his former client might reasonably have assumed (hf1! would withhold
i.pjii i»f5. l}reKenj

.•Jieiii

" MI i ii

1)94, imn (9th i in. iWWi

;if TI quoting Chrisicnsen \. District Coutl, H4*l V.26

nut UHIMCII ,HI concerns an attorney's qualification*, to

represent an adversary oJ a former clicnl

Whether

f

lie attorney learned confidential

inf on inaf ion from the former client is relevant to whether the ifforoey IMH lopresonl I he
forme: client's adversary, but iias nuiiiing IO do wim uunwail . aoilit> to protrrl m n.iied
Park's shareholders or whether he was "independent in any real sensed

Mlchelsen v.

Penney, l.lii I" !M .i( Jlf. n !* Moignn Fidelity argues (till Fii'il Seem My1'. longstanding
relationships with Anaconda and ASARt V» aie "merely hanking ielationsliips. ' M-V Hi. .it
I,)1

I'hMl hi exactly the ponif
•*

.mdinrt iv '

ih, 1 d

ii,|f

Anaconda and ASARO) were First Securities

sl •)MV»TI'. tnd I , i " !

Srnmi

"t'uHiif

"*i Mom

Mrn.Mnnnft

because AMO'F guaranteed its loan io (iPCll. Harold i'teele therefore would not assort
United Park f s claims even if lie knew af)Oiit thorn.11' Finally, Morgan-Fidelity argue that

15

The cases upon which defendants principally rely involve directors who were
elected long after the wrongdoing occurred and were not conceivably implicated. Those
cases do not find that a director at the time of the wrongdoing, who allegedly
participated in or ratified the wrongdoing, was independent for purposes of the statute
of limitations. See, e.g., International Railways of Central America v. United Fruit Co.,
373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967) (three independent directors
elected to board after wrongdoing occurred); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1983) (applying International Railways where make-up of board had changed substantially
and none of the directors were alleged to be implicated;; Curtis v. Connly, 257 ILS vfi
(1921) (three new and unimplicated directors had com* on the board after ti<o aJlr-tred
wrongdoing and had not taken action themselves v :; : h« ^nifaUon c T^n^j
16

Morgan-Fidelity argues that it is "pure specm.* an tiuii Steeie may nave u ~~r
unaware of the misrepresentations or omissions in the I'.oxy Statement or o\ the CUw - •*!
letter, M-F Br. at 33, but it is an inference to which l-nitcd Park was fully entitle-. sn
summary judgment, because Steele did not attend either meeting. It appears that Steeie
took "only a limited interest in the corporation's affairs," detiaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co., 286 F. Supp. at 814, and "exercised little if any independent supervision. Farmers
& Merchants NatM Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1524 (loth Cir. 1990). But if he was
Kit inued...)
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there is no evidence that Romney acted on any instructions from Anaconda or ASARCO,
M-F Br. at 34, but this is squarely contradicted by the facts recited above.

Romney

responded to the Gartner letter, sent telegrams to Gartner and other shareholders and
proceeded with the special meeting all at the direction of Anaconda and ASARCO.
Some defendants attempt to inflate the status of LaMar Osika, United Park's
secretary-treasurer.

See e.g., R.S. Br. at 38-41. Royal Street mischaracterizes Osika

as United Park's "negotiator" during the restructuring, id. at 39, and argues that Osika
was independent of Anaconda and ASARCO and could have asserted United Park's claims.
Id. at 41. As Royal Street knows, Clark Wilson took the lead for United Park during the
restructuring. (R. 7930 at 125) Some of the participants could not even recall Osika.
(R. 7921 at 166; 7954 at 146-7) Osika was not a director of United Park or a member
of its executive or management committee (R. 7944 at 14), and "never felt that [he]
could actually make a decision," but was free to give his "comments and work with the
directors." Id. at 30.
Thus, Osika worked for Anaconda's Clark Wilson, his direct supervisor as United
Park's president, and had no authority to take any action.

Osika was beholden to

Anaconda and ASARCO for his employment, and could not assert United Park's claims
without jeopardizing his employment. Moreover, to the extent that Osika participated
in the negotiations or preparation of the Proxy Statement, Osika was implicated in the
wrongdoing and was not independent for that reason as well.

To paint Osika as the

vigilant bulwark ready to protect United Park's shareholders from wrongdoing is absurd
and at most presents a question of fact.
Again, a jury would be entitled, if not compelled, to conclude that United Park's
outside directors were directed and controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO. They were
elected by Anaconda and ASARCO, had long-standing business relationships with them,

16

(...continued)
aware of the misrepresentations or the Gartner letter, Steele too was implicated in the
wrongdoing.
24

could have been implicated in the wrongdoing. Because a jury could reasonably conclude
that the outside directors were unable or i inwil ling to protect I Inited Park or its outside

1990) (discussed infra at 28-29), their knowledge cannot be imputed to I Inited Park.
C.

United Park Has No Burden To "Negate the Possibility" That An Informed
Director or Shareholder Could I lave Brought Suit, But Even if the Bi n den
Applies, United Park Met It,

Some d
nnea Park \n -VM >nda a:m ASAK<!0 ana fr> «r , He'

compleli* and ^••lusn<- ' ^nt;^r i«i
the "possibilit"

,K

"*

* .*-.»-.. . , i<h^if!^

COrpoi 2

.

-r^ r * 0 *

•

•

Central America v. United Fruit Co., 373 }*.:'-' -iw- .N
,>l

(19fi'

"

* -dr:

r

'\V'»4'-v *\r < ** ».\

•

•

.

•

.v.

,. ]**<*, ^

e t i i j u u i . . ! . : ,i. ^ ~t

oj

ir.), i*ert. denied, /S'

O'

n e t s alleged and established by

L.a..,.
First, defendants 1 assertion stanc: :*:
United P T ' M -

- - - *

mat/: ,a

,;.,

198-

; »• :,.-.•

i"ruL(Ml

or snarehoider couiu na\< !

- :: »

summary judgment M-ndei

'**~:v~rit u /: *o demor/a:ai-

j .

' * ' . . ,

\iarn

- 'ji
n-".".I'V*

* id
J %

""

a!

:a. .a- •

'i- /at* • :x aos* ;!>ilit\' Miai v

nl^nn^ci dirortor

--/"/

Second, many con* :. . :.. : ,-. /: t j Internationa. Kaiiua^s and instead adopted the
principle of "adverse doinma! lan '

!

s !-^ M .it \i\< M unsta! <ons is tolled as long as the

controlling shareholders or directors -• ' w /^-- lorninate a ma j'ority of the boai d, \i 1 lethei
or not a minor itj of 1:1 le boat: d is i .jepenaen

: I: iese coin ts 1: lave "concluded tl i.at the

adverse domii latioi I i i lie more ac ui ; : i • . _. reflects tl le real ities of suing wrongdoing

25

directors who control a corporation." FDIC v. Howse, 736 F.Supp. 1437, 1442 (S.D. Tex.
1990).17
Third, International Railways applies only when a corporation knows about its
claims, but lacks the ability to sue because defendants control the corporation.

The

burden does not apply where the corporation asserts, ats United Park does, that it could
not discover its claims as well. In International Railways, the corporation did not dispute
"that sufficient knowledge of the claims existed long before" its complaint was filed, 373
F.2d at 412, but argued that it could not bring suit despite its knowledge because United
Fruit Co. controlled its board. (United Fruit's own shareholders had brought a derivative
action arising out of the same traasactions in 1949, which resulted in a ruling establishing
breaches of fiduciary duty in 1957. Id. at 410.) The court held that where a corporation
seeks to toll the statute of limitations solely because of domination, "once the facts
giving rise to possible liability are known," the corporation has the burden to establish
"full, complete and exclusive control" and must "negate the possibility" that an
independent director or outsider shareholder could have brought suit.

Id. at 414

(emphasis added). The court specifically distinguished decisions in which domination was

As the court noted in FDIC v. Howse, the International Railways standard "has
not found support outside the Second and Ninth Circuits," while the "adverse domination"
principle has gained "widespread support among other courts." 736 F.Supp. at 1441-42.
The court stated the reason for the adverse domination principle as follows:
As long as the majority of the board of directors are culpable
they may continue to operate the association and control it
in an effort to prevent action from being; taken against them.
While they retain control they can dominate the non-culpable
directors and control the most likely sources of information
and funding necessary to pursue the rights of the association.
As a result, it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for the corporation to discover and pursue its rights while the
wrongdoers retain control.
Id. at 1442, quoting FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.Supp. 1184, 1193, n.12 (D. Md. 1984).
Accord, First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 563-64 (3rd
Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 1013 (1980); FDIC v. Paul, 735 F.Supp. 375, 377 (D.
Utah 1990); FDIC v. Manatt, 723 F.Supp. 99, 105 (E.D. Ark. 1989); FDIC v. Berry, 659
F.Supp. 1475, (E.D. Tenn. 1987); FDIC v. Bird, 516 F.Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981); Allen v.
Wilderson, 396 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
26

Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 931 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasizing that International
Railways involved "special facts" oi "uniqi le facts 11 "where there had been a prior
successfi ll dei i : ativ e action an I thei c < as a si lbstantial

rnlorl

directors 11 ).
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•m

Id. at 879. 18

The other decisions cited by d
e.g..,, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 7 . - ; ^d Cir, 1983) (dismissing complaint where
"well-publicized SEC action" two years earlier had "set forth in considerable detail many
of the wrongs" and plaintiffs 1 "generalized and conclusory allegations of f r r n ^ ' ^ n t
concealment do not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)"); Hum - -:a
n.
Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 606 F.Supp. 1348, 1354 (N.D. Ala. ~1985)~~"aff' '. S 3
F 2d i o i l (11th Cir. 1986) (barring receiver's cause of action on behalf of bankrupt
coi poratioo, whose shareholders had actual knowledge of claims and filed two separate
derivative actions five years earlier; court noting that s t a t u t e would not i i in if
shareholders had no knowledge of claims)
27

Fourth, even if International Railways applies, United Park has met that burden.
In International Railways, the court held that the corporation failed to meet its burden
because three directors had been elected years after the wrongdoing, and the evidence
indicated that they might have been "highly responsive" to a stockholder's demand to sue.
One director had been nominated to the board on a slate opposing the controlling
shareholders, and the other two directors had aided outside shareholders in another
lawsuit against the controlling shareholders, 373 F.2d at 414 & n.7.
In an analogous situation, the Tenth Circuit recently held that a corporation
satisfied International Railways despite the presence of two outside directors on the
board.

In Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990),

defendants sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that a bank's suit against
former controlling directors for making imprudent loans was not tolled while the directors
controlled the bank. Defendants argued that the "existence of two outside directors on
[the] board of directors negates;, as a matter of law, application of the adverse
domination theory," but the court found this argument "without merit." 902 F.2d at 1523.
The court stated that the International Railways inquiry is "inherently fact-specific," and
explained that a "plaintiff may also demonstrate adverse domination by proving that an
informed director, though capable of suing, would not do so." Id. The court found that
plaintiffs introduced "sufficient evidence to withstand defendants' motion for directed
verdict on the question of the outside directors' ability or willingness to bring suit on
behalf of the corporation." Id. at 1524. The court baised this finding on testimony that
the "outside directors exercised little, if any, independent supervision over the lending
activities of the bank." Id.
Unlike the directors in International Railways, United Park's outside directors
unquestionably would not have been "highly responsive" to a demand to sue. Instead they
actively dissuaded Gartner and a few other shareholders from opposing or questioning
the Agreements. United Park's directors were affirmatively hostile to any shareholder
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action, not merely Indifferent or ignorant: as were the oi
Merchant's Nat'l Bank

If the International Railways burdei applies, mere! »

^Llllf~::\J^.
' *rA

I
D.

Wheeler Sears 1 Tenure as President of United Park is Factually and Legally
Irrelevant Because Sears 1 Conflict of Interesl Precluded Discoveiy and
Assertion of United P a r k ' s Claims.

Defendants 1 initial summary judgment memoranda argued a s an alternative t h a t
United Pari* '.I nilii have discovered and asserted it*; fiduciary duly claims in 1982 after
Wheeler S e a r s became president

I I hilled I'.iil

mil i v\w e s e n u i i v c i I < 'muiron

Corporation replaced Anaconda r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on United P a r k ' s Board of Director?., At
on .ill iiirfiuiiiHil, howcvei, di (nidLiii! •; abandoned Hie 1082 d a t e and relied solely on t h e
1*171) d a t e , (1? /M2IJ al 101) IIHI 'I he dislnet uniil""", I IIidling i*l l a c ! ,i mil eonrliiMnii 1 . ol
law make no r e f e r e n c e t o Wheeler Sears 1 tenure or to t h e 1982 d a t e .
fin appeal, Mime rli'lendnnli: r e s u r r e c t Wheelei Sear"; 1 t e n u r e as a ground for
affirming the district court, They base this argument on a l i m i t , com IUMH.V allulavil IK
4050-57) in which S e a r s s t a t e d that he performed a "thorough review" of t h e 1975 Resort
Agreement .ill i becoming president ol I Imled Pailk and discussed the agreements
frequently with members of United Paik1" • liooid ol DiiecLoi.'i. bee A&A Mi. .if Ml, IU
' l«
Br, al 37, The facts, however, contradict Sears 1 testimony and explain why defendants
abandoned then relianii on M
li m
iI' VlH? dah before the court below,
First, I line is no reference in any ol the Hoaul meeting minutes dm mg Sean,'
tenure to any review of l lie agreements by Sears oi the Board, oi to any discussion
a moil (.», Hoard mi'mber, ul I lit f,iiiine,s%. ol Hie aurcemenP; (If I1042 (5i!35) Second, llupft
Leach, a member ol llie United Paik Itoaid Ihiouj'houl .Searii1 tenure, lestilied by
affidavit19 that Sears

The Leach affidavit is the one substantive affidavit that Royal Street does not
move to strike. Instead, Royal Street argues that the Leach affidavit is "irrelevant," R.
St. Br. at 25 n.3, presumably because defendants abandoned their reliance on Sears at
argument below
29

never apprised the United Park Board of Directors or
Stockholders of any investigation of the 1975 restructuring
agreements, nor did the Board during Mr. Sears' tenure review
or consider the fairness or propriety of these 1975
agreements, whether the agreements could be renegotiated, or
if there was any legal basis for United Park to challenge the
agreements.
(R. 4810)
Third, and most significant, Sears had a conflict of interest that precluded his
assertion of claims on behalf of United Park. Throughout his tenure as president and a
director of United Park, Sears was also president of Cimarron and the owner of nearly
half of Cimarron's shares. (R. 4050) Sears became president of United Park to effect
a merger between Cimarron and United Park in which owners of Cimarron shares would
exchange their shares for United Park shares. (R. 4771-72) If Sears ever reviewed the
1975 Resort Agreements, he did so on behalf of Cimarron in connection with the proposed
merger. The purpose was not to assess the fairness of the Agreements to United Park
vis-a-vis defendants, but to assess the value of United Park's shares vis-a-vis Cimarron's
shares. Id.
To accomplish a merger on the best possible terms for Cimarron and himself, Sears
had every incentive to devalue United Park.

Cimarron shares would be worth more

relative to United Park shares, and Sears would receive more United Park shares for the
nearly fifty percent of the Cimarron shares that he owned.

Sears had absolutely no

incentive to discover or assert United Park's fiduciary duty claims because the claims
would decrease the value of Cimarron shares relative to United Park shares.

Sears'

conflict became more acute when some United Park shareholders challenged the proposed
merger as overstating the value of Cimarron and understating the value of United Park.
In response to this challenge, Sears had to maintain that United Park was valued
appropriately. Sears also would not assert claims against Anaconda and ASARCO because
he needed the support of Anaconda and ASARCO to effect the merger.

(R. 4770-75)

This conflict continued after the merger proposal was defeated because Sears continued
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eras is not clear, it is plain that there was no significant
change in terms of the likelihood of a suit similar to the
present one being brought.
619 F.2d at 930 (emphasis added).
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AS BARRED BY
BANGOR PUNTA.
The Bangor Punta doctrine bars a corporation from asserting claims against former

shareholders when the current shareholders purchased all or virtually all of the
corporation's shares from the wrongdoers.

The district court misapplied the Bangor

Punta doctrine to bar United Park's fiduciary duty claims in their entirety (R. 7855 at
WI3,4) even though only one shareholder, Loeb, purchased 31.1 percent of United Park's
shares from Anaconda and ASARCO. In supporting the district court's ruling, Anaconda
and ASARCO misread Bangor Punta, ignore decisions construing the doctrine, and assert
facts that: are not in evidence and would be irrelevant: anyway.
Contrary to the assertion of Anaconda and ASARCO, Bangor Punta does not bar
United Park's claims simply because "Loeb was not a stockholder at the time the alleged
mismanagement occurred and because Loeb acquired its stock from the alleged
wrongdoers."

A&A Br. at 52. The Supreme Court barred the corporation's claim in

Bangor Punta because the current shareholders had purchased virtually all of the
corporation's shares from the wrongdoers. For that reason the Supreme Court found the
current shareholders the "real party in interest," disregarded the corporate form, and
barred the corporation's claim.

See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor &

Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711-13 (1974),
Anaconda and ASARCO assert that "[n]o case has suggested that the Bangor Punta
doctrine is limited to situations where a plaintiff has; purchased all or substantially all
of the company's stock."
decisions in its brief.20

20

A&A Br. at 56. To the contrary, United Park cited three

In fact, no court has barred a corporation's claim where former

In Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024 (Neb. 1903), the court barred
a corporation from recovery because all current shareholders purchased from former
shareholders. Dean Pound explicitly stated that the corporation would be entitled to
recovery if any current shareholders were shareholders at the time of the wrongdoing,
because those shareholders would be "entitled to complain of the acts of the defendant
and of his past mismanagement of the company . . . ." 93 N.W. at 1028. In In re
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Securities and Antitrust Litigation, 387 F. Supp. 906, 911
(continued...)
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(E.D. Pa. 1974), the com t o*^ i:.r,ii;y held that ». .;;h .>oraL:<... i:> .;..:^;ea LO ICCOU-: "if
there are minority shareholders who were such at the time of the alleged wrongful
transaction/' The court added that the "net result" of Bangor Punta is that "no recovery
can be had by a plaintiff corporation where the beneficiary of a recovery would be a
corporation which had purchased 99$ of the stock of the plaintiff corporation after the
alleged wrongful transactions." (emphasis in original) In National Union Elec. Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F.Supp. 991 (E.D, Pa. 1980), the court emphasized that
Bangor Punta is a "narrow doctrine," id. at 1005, "that cannot be read to bar recovery
wherever a corporation seeks to recover for Injury suffered before new owners acquired
its shares," Tri. if 1002.
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premium for its shares over their value in 1975.

(R. 4737)

Loeb will not enjoy a

windfall, because United Park in all probability will not pay any dividend even if it
recovers on its claims. Id. And their assertion that the Bambergers should be required
to bring a derivative suit, A&A Br. at 58, is as illogical as the district court's finding
that the Bambergers would receive a windfall (R. 7855 at 113). Again, the Bambergers
have been shareholders since 1953, did not purchase any shares from Anaconda and
ASARCO, and were injured by their wrongdoing, as v/ere United Park's other outside
shareholders.
At a minimum, United Park is entitled to a gro rata recovery. Contrary to the
assertion of Anaconda and ASARCO, the district court did not hold that a pro rata
recovery would be inappropriate without a "compelling showing why no complaints were
asserted by those stockholders over all these years." A&A Br. at 57. Such a holding
would have been a non-sequitur and a redundancy: a non-sequitur because the discovery
and assertion of a complaint is a statute of limitations issue, not a Bangor Punta issue;
a redundancy because United Park has established why it could not discover its fiduciary
duty claims before independent management assumed control of United Park in 1985.
Finally, Bangor Punta does not bar United Park's claims against the other
defendants, none of whom sold shares to Loeb.

The district court purported to bar

United Park's claims against all defendants (R. 7855 at 114), even though the sale of
shares is the factual and equitable predicate for the doctrine.

GPCC and AMOT

acknowledge that they did not seek summary judgment pursuant to Bangor Punta. GPCC
Br. at 30; AMOT Br. at 14-15. Bangor Punta clearly does not bar United Park's claims
against the non-selling defendants; for the reasons stated in United Park's brief.
U.P. Br. at 57.
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VI

u N i T E D PARK HAS ESTAiuJSUED THAT AMO'I ' AND GPCC AIDED AND
ABETTED THE BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY ANACONDA, ASARCO,
MORGAN FIDELITY AND R(M -M STREET.
Liability for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty requires proof of a
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AMOT acquired a

ski resort which then accounted for one-third of Utah's ski-rental and valuable property
interests worth many times its small investment. (R. 4754; 4765)
These facts establish AMOT's aiding and abetting liability.

When corporate

representatives breach their fiduciary duties by failing to protect corporate interests or
preferring themselves in a corporate transaction, the other party aids and abets that
breach by consummating the transaction with knowledge of the breach.

In Penn Mart

Realty Co. v. Becker, a corporation's shareholders sued its directors for breach of
fiduciary duty because the directors sold corporate assets for less than their value. The
court held that the shareholders stated an aiding and abetting claim against the
purchaser because it completed the purchase knowing the true value of the assets. The
court stated that plaintiffs
argue that the [directors] were grossly negligent, wasted
corporate assets, and therefore breached their fiduciary duty,
by selling a corporate asset . . . to [defendants] at a price
greatly less than they knew, and had in fact determined, to
be its true worth. [Defendants] knew that they were dealing
with fiduciaries, knew the true worth of the asset through
their inside information, and nevertheless aided the directors
in the breach of their duties . . . The legal theory is sound.
The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship
to a corporation's shareholders. And one who knowingly joins
with any fiduciary in a breach of his obligation is liable to the
beneficiaries of the trust relationship.
298 A.2d at 351 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Gilbert v. El Paso Co., El Paso's directors breached their fiduciary
duties by structuring El Paso's response to Burlington's friendly tender offer so that the
directors tendered their shares to Burlington, thereby denying other shareholders the
opportunity to tender their shares. The court held that Burlington aided and abetted the
breach by purchasing the shares with the "presumed knowledge of El Paso's fiduciary
duty to protect the interest of the! shareholders":
Clearly, the purchase of approximately 556,000 shares from El
Paso's directors falls within the gambit of a claim of civil
conspiracy. By agreeing to purchase them from El Paso's
directors, Burlington is chargeable with knowledge that El
Paso's directors were preferring their interests to certain of
its shareholders who had already tendered. . . . To the extent
36

those shareholders suffered damages, an issue not contested
by Burlington in context of its motion for summary judgment,
the elements of a civil conspiracy appeal complete.
490 A.2d a t 1057. 21
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participate in the target board's breach of fiduciary duty by
extracting terms which require the opposite party to prefer
its interests at the expense of its shareholders.
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AMOT's aiding and abetting 1 iabilitj , however, does not rest solely on its knowing

participation in the breach because Nicholas Badarni, A MO' r ' s president, attended the
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Badami began by telling the shareholders that "timing is probably the essence of
the whole [ski] business" and that AMOT had assumed control of the ski resort in May
because "the ski season is made or broken from May to opening day." Badami told the
shareholders that when he heard about the Gartner letter, "we were quite upset because
an adjournment of this meeting was something we had not counted on under any
circumstance." Badami then described his experience as a businessman and a ski resort
operator, concluding that "I really, from a business decision, can't see how the Mining
Company could have made any other decision than the one they made to insure the
continuity of the resort."

(R. 5941-42) Badami emphasized that if the resort fails to

open on time, it is "a very difficult thing to start up again." Badami asserted that the
United Park's rights under the Resort Agreements "would probably become meaningless
as far as the bottom land was concerned and the lease on the ski rights, of course, would
be in the same position. So that I feel that an adjournment of this decision would be
disastrous because we are geared up to get this operation open to the public as soon as
we have snowfall."

Just before he disparaged the Gartner letter, Badami told the

shareholders that the 1975 Resort. Agreements were a "good decision from a business
standpoint" and that the "decision now should be to proceed." Id.
AMOT attempts to characterize Badami's speech as a "difference of opinion
between him and Gartner," and asserts that United Park's "shareholders were free to
choose between the two views."

AMOT Br. at 27.

AMOT also asserts that United

Park's shareholders did not "rely" on Badami's statements because "sufficient shares to
approve the transactions had already been voted by proxy prior to the meeting." Id. But
Badami's speech was intended not only to solicit votes for approval, but to insure that
the shareholders did not demand adjournment, take any action opposing the agreements,
or do anything that required full disclosure of Badami's great corporate opportunity.
AMOT also asserts that "there was no basis" for United Park's shareholders to
"rely on Badami" because he "obviously was acting on behalf of his own shareholders,"
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— A M O T also makes a fr ivolous argument that I Jnited Par k fails to plead aiding and
abetting with the particularity required by Utah R. Civ; P. 9(b). AMOT Br. at 22-24.
Even if Rule 9(b) applies to allegations of aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty,
the Amended Complaint satisfies the Rule's "time, place, and manner" requirements.
Paragraphs 61, 71-74, and 90-99 of the Amended Complaint alleges t h a t AMOT knew ARCO
and ASARCO had breached their fiduciary duties to United Park, and alleges the
substantive a c t s committed by AMOT to aid and abet the breaches. (R. 2789-90, 280001, 2806-10) Other paragraphs specify the terms of the agreement that were unfair, and
the misrepresentations, omissions, and other acts undertaken that precluded discovery of
the breaches of fiduciary duty. Rule 9(b) is intended to give the defendant "fair notice
of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Ross v. A. H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). The
"key to any Rule 9(b) motion is whether the complaint can apprise the defendant of the
alleged conduct with enough detail to enable the defendant to prepare a defense."
Feinman v. Schulman Berlin & Davis, 677 F Si ipp 168, ] 72 (S.D.N Y. 1988). United
(continued...)
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B.

GPCC Knowingly Participated in the Breaches of Fiduciary Duty.

GPCC also argues that United Park has no aiding and abetting claim against it.
Significantly, GPCC does not challenge any of the facts establishing aiding and abetting
liability.

GPCC knew the undisclosed terms of the Agreements and the true value of

United Park's development properties and water rights, and Park City's great skiing
potential. See U.P. Br. at 61. GPCC refused to take other available steps to solve its
financial difficulties because Royal Street, GPCC's manager, wanted to retain all
development properties for itself. GPCC defaulted on its obligations to United Park, but
not to other land owners, at the same time it was acquiring additional properties (R.
4782).
Instead, GPCC draws a distinction between "old" GPCC, in which United Park,
Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity owned shares, and "new" GPCC, which AMOT purchased
through the 1975 Resort Agreements.

GPCC argues that Royal Street and Morgan-

Fidelity committed the wrongdoing, not GPCC itself. GPCC Br. at 34-35. GPCC cites
no authority for this proposition, but relies on United Park's assertion that coshareholders in a close corporation owe each other the same fiduciary duties that
partners owe each other. Id. But the fact that Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity owe
fiduciary duties to United Park hets nothing to do with GPCC's liability.

GPCC is a

corporation with an independent existence. It had officers and employees (including, for
example, Robert Wells and Harold Taylor), who were not employees of Royal Street or
Morgan-Fidelity. By asserting that: its shareholders, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity,
committed the wrongdoing, GPCC in effect demands that its corporate veil be pierced.
Such a demand is nonsensical on these facts. The corporate veil doctrine protects an
injured party when wrongdoers assert corporate formalities as a defense to liability; the

(...continued)
Park's Amended Complaint not only enabled AMOT to prepare a defense, AMOT has done
so.
40
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were

"procedurally

unconscionable".

See

Resource

Management, 706 P.2d at 1042; U.P. Br. at 64-65. At the very least, that evidence
created an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.

United Park also presented

substantial evidence that the 1975 Resort Agreements as a whole, and in particular, the
Water Agreement and the Ski Lease extensions, were substantively unconscionable. See
Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1041-42; U.P. Br. at 19-23, 65-66.

Defendants

presented no evidence to the district court, and there is none in the record,
demonstrating that the Agreements were fair to United Park.
The district court made no finding that the 1975 Resort Agreements were not
unconscionable.

Rather, it dismissed, as a matter of law,

United Park's prayer for

reformation on essentially two grounds: (1) as to the claim against Royal Street, estoppel
based on the Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates; and (2) as to the claims against Royal
Street, GPCC and Morgan-Fidelity, waiver or estoppel based on United Park's acceptance
of payments under the Agreements;.24 This was error.
A.

The Wells Fargo Estoppel Certificates Do Not Bar United Park's Prayer for
Reformation Against Royal Street.
1.

United Park is not estopped from seeking reformation.

Wells Fargo argues that United Park is estopped from seeking reformation of the
Deer Valley Lease by the Estoppel Certificates ("Certificates") it executed in 1981 and
1982 pursuant to Wells Fargo's extension of credit to Royal Street.

Wells Fargo 1 s

23

GPCC's contention that the 1975 Resort Agreements were "heavily negotiated by
sophisticated businessmen with competent counsel," GPCC Br. at 38, while true as to the
defendants, but not as to United Park (R. 7954 at 147), is nonetheless irrelevant for
purposes of the issue of procedural unconscionability. The "sophisticated businessmen"
purportedly on United Park's side of the negotiations were fiduciaries who did what they
were told to do by Anaconda and ASARCO and then misled the United Park shareholders.
But it was the shareholders who had to approve the Agreements, it was the shareholders
who were misled and it was the shareholders who were coerced into a hasty vote on a
transaction that their fiduciaries did not fully disclose with the excuse that it was "very
complex and difficult to understand." (R. 7252)
24

The district court also dismissed all of United Park's claims attacking the 1975
Resort Agreements on statute of limitations grounds. That was error for the reasons
stated above.
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Furthermore, the question of estoppel should not be determined on summary
judgment. Issues of waiver and estoppel are questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact
and law, which should be resolved by the trier of fact. American Falls Canal Securities
Co. v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n., 775 P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989). Estoppel is a
question of law only where the facts and circumstances are admitted or where only one
inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.25 Id. In this case, both the facts
are disputed, and more than one inference may be drawn from the evidence. The district
court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, the language of he Certificates bars
United Park's claim for reformation.
2.

United Park has not waived its claim for reformation.

Wells Fargo also argues that the language of the Certificates together with United
Park's acknowledgment in the Consent and Agreements26 that Wells Fargo could succeed
to the rights of Royal Street under the Deer Valley Lease imply the validity of the Lease
and amount to a knowing waiver of any subsequent claim against the leasehold, including
reformation.

Again, at best, both documents support only a waiver with respect to

United Park's claim for underpayment of lease rentals prior to 1982.

^Contrary to Wells Fargo's assertion, there are significant fact issues remaining.
For example, Wells Fargo has provided no evidence that its security would be impaired
by reformation of the Deer Valley Lease to cancel the additional two twenty year
extensions granted by the 1975 Agreements. Even if United Park is granted the
reformation remedy it seeks, termination of the Deer Valley Lease will not take place
until twenty years hence, and Wells Fargo will likely have received repayment of its
loans. Wells Fargo makes unsubstantiated arguments regarding how termination of the
Lease in the year 2011 will have a present detrimental effect on its security (Wells Fargo
Br. at 20-22), but no facts have been established to support this contention. Wells Fargo
has also raised the Line of Credit which it provided to Deer Valley in connection with its
claims of estoppel and waiver, when in fact United Park made no representations in
connection with the Line of Credit transaction. These factual questions, crucial to a
determination of estoppel and waiver, are precisely the reason these issues should not be
determined as a matter of law. American Falls, 775 P.2d at 415.
26

United Park executed Consent and Agreement papers along with the Certificates in
both 1981 and 1982. (R. 4476-80; 4486-90)
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A legal duty to speak does not arise unless the party against whom the estoppel
is urged knew or should have known that the failure to speak will likely mislead the
other party to act to his or her detriment.*7 Wells Fctrgo has provided no evidence to
support a duty to speak, or to show that United Park knew, or had reason to know that
Wells Fargo was relying on United Park's silence as an .assurance that United Park would
never assert an adverse claim of any type under the 1975 Resort Agreements.

Indeed,

such an assertion is simply inconsistent with the specific statements in the Certificates,
which are limited to issues of default under the Deer Valley Lease (R 4473-74; 4482-84).
Furthermore, Wells Fargo has presented no evidence that United Park's silence was
willful or culpable.
Estoppel is not a favored doctrine, and may be sustained only upon a showing of
clear and convincing evidence. Berglund and Berglund, Inc. v. Contributions Bureau, 784
P.2d 933 (Mont. 1990). Wells Fargo has not met its heavy burden.28

27

In Knapp v. Daily, 772 P.2d 1363 (Or. App. 1989), for example, the plaintiff began
replacing a fence that separated his property from defendant, placing the new fence
directly on the property line. The old fence meandered back and forth across the straight
property line described in the deeds to the two parcels. When defendant discovered the
construction of the new fence, plaintiff informed him that he intended to bill defendant
for one-half of the cost of the fence. Defendant had little comment and did not protest
plaintiff's plan. The court held that defendant's silence did not work an estoppel, because
plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant was aware his failure to object would
mislead the plaintiff. Id. at 136(5. See also McCallister v. Lusk, 693 P.2d 575 (N.M.
1984) (doctrine of estoppel by silence did not apply because buyers provided no evidence
that sellers knew that either buyers or buyers' successors in interest were relying on
sellers' silence as a basis for using escrow company to meet their payment obligations
under the real estate contract).
28

Wells Fargo argues that its security under the 1981 and 1982 mortgages will be
impaired by reformation of United Park's mining reservation in the Water Agreement,
Wells Fargo Br. at 21-22, but in fact, none of the water rights subject to United Park's
mining reservation and therefore its reformation claim are subject to Wells Fargo's
mortgage. The 1981 and 1982 mortgages have a security interest only in those water
rights which are appurtenant to the properties covered by the mortgage. (R. 1569; 1612;
1651; 1721) United Park's reservation applies only to Group II water. Because none of
the Group II water claims were claimed for use upon or for the benefit of the mortgaged
land, these water rights are not appurtenant to the mortgaged land.
(R. 4824)
Therefore, the 1981 and 1982 mortgages give Wells Fargo no security interest in any of
the water subject to United Park's reformation claim.
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United Park f s Acceptance of I 'ayments Under the Water Agreement and the
Ski Leases Does Not Bar United Park's Prayer for Reformation of Those
Agreements.
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However in this case, the Water Agreement has not been fully performed because United
Park has continuing rights under it.

As is clear from Paragraph 1 of the Water

Agreement (R. 5088-89) and from the Conveyance of Water Rights (Addendum B), United
Park's perpetual reservation of Group II water survives and continues after payment of
the purchase price.30 Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1988) (reservation
creates or reserves to grantor some right, interest or profit relationship to the estate
granted).

In fact, United Park continues to use Group II water to perform mine

maintenance, (R. 4825) as is its right under the reservation.

GPCC's suggestion that

United Park has lost its reservation, GPCC Br. at 43, is unsupported and is directly
contrary to the water conveyance/'11
Finally, GPCC's claim that United Park has somehow waived its claim for
reformation of the Water Agreement by releasing title to the water is ludicrous. United
Park released title pursuant to the lower court's order, which is the subject of this
appeal* The release of title to the water does not affect the validity of United Park's
perpetual reservation which is incorporated in the conveyance of water rights.

After describing the water and water rights sold to defendants, the Conveyance
expressly states:
Excepting and reserving unto Grantor [United Park] the prior right
to use, or to lease or grant to others the right to use, for mining, milling
and related purposes, the first twenty-eight hundred and fifty (2,850)
gallons per minute from the aggregate water yield of the water and water
rights identified and described in Group II above.
Grantor covenants and agrees that it will hereafter execute, without
warranty, and deliver to Grantee [GPCC] such further instruments of
assignment or conveyance, or furnish such other instruments from its records
as it may possess and which may be required by the State Engineer of Utah
to complete transfer of the water and water rights hereinabove identified
from Grantor to Grantee, subject always, however, to the exception and
reservation to Grantor, its lessees and assigns, of the water and water
rights as herein set forth. (Emphasis added)
31

Because GPCC did not raise and the district court did not address any issue
regarding the viability of United Park's reservation under the Water Agreement, that
issue is not before this Court or relevant to this appeal.
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Thus, because United Park has continuing rights and GPCC and Royal Street have
continuing duties under the Water Agreement,32 GPCC's argument, unsupported by any
case authority, that a fully performed contract cannot be reformed is irrelevant to this
case. Moreover, it is legally wrong. Under the doctrine of unconscionability, the court
can construe a contract ~ here the Water Agreement's reservation — to avoid an
unconscionable result even if the other parties to the contract have fully performed.
See, e.g., Jensen v. Southwestern States Management Co., 629 P.2d 752 (Kan. App. 1981)
(court reformed 55-year old mineral deeds which contained unconscionable provision).
United Park presented substantial evidence that the Water Agreement's reservation must be reformed to avoid an unconscionable result.

(R. 4762-63) Due to the

breaches of fiduciary duty by Anaconda, ASARCO, Royal Street and Morgan-Fidelity,
United Park sold water worth more than $2 million for a present value payment of
$350,000.

(R. 7941 at 215; 4762-63; 4843-45)

The volume of water sold was much

greater than either GPCC or Royal Street needed as is clear from the fact that all of
the Group II water is subject to United Park's prior, perpetual mining reservation. Due
to Anaconda's and ASARCO's breach of fiduciary duty, the reservation was not expanded
beyond mining, milling and related purposes in 1975 even though United Park was giving
up its equity position in GPCC and GPCC and Royal Street did not need the Group II
water. 33

This left United Park without water to develop its surface properties and

As explained more fully below, the continuing viability of United Park's reservation
means that Royal Street and GPCC have continuing duties to take no action to prejudice
that reservation and are required to treat the water.
Royal Street acquired one-half of the Group II water for its land development
projects, leaving one-half with GPCC even though GPCC was no longer involved in land
development and allegedly did not consider the water valuable. (R. 7941 at 202-04)
GPCC argues that United Park's inability to use the mining reservation water for mining
was totally foreseeable in 1975 because neither United Park nor Park City Ventures had
been able to show a profit from mining operations. GPCC Br. at 40. If this was
foreseeable, then Anaconda and ASARCO's fiduciary derelictions were even more
egregious. However, GPCC misrepresents its cited source, which reports that Park City
Ventures had been engaged in development and not full scale production before May 1975
(continued...)
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wholly dependent on mining operations controlled by Anaconda and ASARCO.

The

unconscionability of the Water Agreement, as GPCC would have it construed, is further
underscored by GPCC's position that United Park must pay the very substantial annual
water treatment costs for Group II water from the Ontario Tunnel, but cannot use that
reserved water for development purposes while GPCC claims it does not use or need the
water.

Such a construction of the Water Agreement is substantively unconscionable

because the terms are "so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party";
they reflect "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain";
and they reflect a "significant cost-price disparity." Resource Management, 706 P.2d at
1041-42.
The unconscionability of the Ski Lease rental payments to United Park and the
lease extensions is also readily apparent. United Park receives annually approximately
$60,000 from Morgan-Fidelity for the lease of nearly 6,000 acres, while Morgan-Fidelity
nets some $1 million annually under its sublease to GPCC of the same property.

(R.

4768-70) Thus, United Park only receives about $10 per acre per year for its lease of
these increasingly valuable lands. This will continue, unless reformed, until the year
2051 with United Park f s percentage of ski lease revenues increasing by only 1/2 of 1%
for each twenty-year extension. The same unconscionable percentages and extensions
apply to the Deer Valley Ski Lease, which in 1975 Royal Street offered to sublease to
GPCC for ski development for seven times the percentage of annual ski revenue that
Royal Street was required under the lease to pay to United Park. (R. 4751-52; 7940 at
160-62)
In sum, the district court erred in dismissing United Park's prayer for reformation
of the Water Agreement and the Ski Leases.

^C...continued)
and says nothing about United Park's mining operations. GPCC does not argue that the
water treatment costs, which were over $350,000 per year, were also foreseeable.
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VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE RESORT
AGREEMENTS
A,

The District Court Erred in Dismissing United Park's Claims
for Breach of the Water Agreement.

United Park alleges that GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Water
Agreement in two respects. First, they breached paragraph 14 of the Water Agreement
in 1987 by filing bad faith protests with the State Engineer challenging United Park's
application for an extension of time to resume use of certain Group II water rights which
are subject to United Park's prior, perpetual reservation. (R. 4831-32). Second, GPCC
has breached its duty under paragraph 5 to pay for the cost of treating the water from
the Ontario No.2 Drain Tunnel. These substantial costs to United Park, which began in
1982, average over $350,000 each year, and totaled some $2,650,000 at the end of 1989.
(R. 4833) As United Park demonstrated in its opening brief, the district court's dismissal
of these claims on the ground of waiver was error. See U.P. Br. at 71-72.
Similarly erroneous was the district court's holding that payment of the purchase
price under the Water Agreement has "cured" these breaches. As described above, United
Park's rights under the reservation continue after payment and conveyance. Defendants'
bad faith protests have jeopardized United Park's continuing rights to the reserved flows.
Payment of the purchase price does not and cannot cure this breach.
Nor can payment of the purchase price "cure" GPCC's failure to pay for water
treatment in the past or in the future. Clearly, GPCC's failure to pay for treatment of
the Ontario Drain Tunnel flow between 1982 and 1989 was not cured by payment of the
purchase price in January 1990. Under the Water Agreement, the duty to pay for water
treatment is separate from and independent of the duty to pay the purchase price for the
water. (R. 5090-91) There is also no basis for GPCC's contention that its duty to treat
the Ontario Tunnel water ended with the payment of the purchase price. Nothing in the
Water Agreement suggests that result, and GPCC presented no evidence suggesting that
such an unconscionable result was intended by the parties.
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For the first time on this appeal, GPCC argues that it has no duty to pay or
reimburse the costs of water treatment because the water is not being "used for the
purposes of [GPCC]."34 GPCC misleads the Court in asserting that it has not been using
the Ontario water for the "purposes of [GPCC]." The Ontario No. 2 Drain Tunnel water
is part of the Group II water rights subject to United Park's reservation. While United
Park uses some Group II water rights for mine maintenance purposes, it does not
currently use all the Group II water.

Under the Welter Agreement, GPCC and Royal

Street have the right and affirmative obligation to use water not being used by United
Park to protect the water from forfeiture. (R. 4824; 5090).

After assuming that

obligation, GPCC cannot now claim that it has not been using the water. 35
Furthermore, GPCC has at times leased the Ontario water to downstream users.
See Addendum C. Clearly this is a use of the water for the "purposes of [GPCC]" within
the meaning of the Water Agreement. At the very least, the issue of GPCC's use of the
Ontario water creates a question of fact which cannot be resolved on summary
judgment36.
Thus, the breaches of the Water Agreement have been neither cured nor waived
and the district court's dismissal of these claims must be reversed.

M

Paragraph 5 of the Water Purchase Agreement provides that "[GPCC] shall, at
its sole expense, treat or purify the Purchased Flow to the extent the same is necessary
before it may be used for the purposes of [GPCC]." (R. 5091).
35

GPCC's position seems to be that it can use the water if it pleases, but it does
not have to inform United Park if or how it is using the water, nor does it have to pay
any cost of treating the water. This position simply jeopardizes the continuing viability
of the water right. Further, if GPCC is in fact not using the water, its non-use provides
another equitable basis for reformation of the Water Agreement to remove any
restrictions on United Park's use of the Group II water, to prevent forfeiture of the
water right.
36

GPCC cites National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
for the proposition that it is the party owning the point source, not the user or owner
of the water which by statute must pay the costs of water treatment. That case is
simply irrelevant here, because the issue in this case is not which party has a statutory
duty to treat the water, but whether GPCC is contractually obligated to pay water
treatment costs. Nothing in the federal Clean Water Act or Utah's statutory equivalent
precludes enforcement of GPCC's contractual duties.
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B.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing United Park's Claim That GPCC and
Royal Street Have Breached the Ski Leases By Understating Lift Revenues.

United Park contends that GPCC and Royal Street have breached the Ski Leases
by failing to include in their lift revenue calculations (a fractional percent of which
United Park receives as rent) the value of lift tickets traded for goods and services,
given on a discounted basis or given for free.

As United Park demonstrated in its

opening brief, the district court's dismissal of this claim on the grounds of waiver or
estoppel is unsupportable because neither GPCC nor Royal Street presented any evidence
below to establish the essential elements of waiver or estoppel. See U.P. Br. at 71-72.
Neither GPCC nor Royal Street, in their briefs on appeal, make any effort to cure this
fatal defect. 37
Even if defendants had established waiver or estoppel as to underpayments
occurring before 1985, that would not bar United Park's claim for full and accurate
payments from 1985 forward.

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(landlords did not waive right to seek arrearages of rent by accepting tenant's rental
payments). Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the claims for breach of the Ski
Leases.
IX.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DISMISSING UNITED PARK'S TRESPASS CLAIMS
A.

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

The Town Lift Trespass Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed.

In 1980, the Third Amendment to the Resort Area Lease removed the area subject
to the Town Lift trespass from the Lease. Nothing in the Third Amendment purports to
condition its effectiveness on the exercise of the Sweeney Option.

(R. 5379-83) The

execution of the Third Amendment was not required under paragraph 14 of the Lease.

37

The only evidence cited by GPCC is the deposition testimony of LaMar Osika to
the effect that it never occurred to him that the value of complimentary lift tickets were
to be included in lift revenues. (R. 7944 at 120) Mr. Osika's testimony is insufficient
to establish waiver or estoppel by the clear and convincing standard required. Berglund
and Berglund, Inc. v. Contributions Bureau, 784 P.2d 933 (Mont. 1990). Moreover, that
testimony says nothing about United Park's knowledge or the propriety of defendants'
exclusion of the value of discounted passes or passes traded for good and services.
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Removal of property from the Lease under paragraph 14 is automatic without the need
for a lease amendment.38 Nonetheless, the parties chose to execute the Third Amendment
which unconditionally removed the described property from the Lease. This Amendment
was supported by consideration: GPCC was afforded a right of first refusal to purchase
the property which it declined to exercise. See Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian
Athletic Ass'n., 670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Idaho 1983) (right of first refusal is consideration).
Thus, the Third Amendment effectively removed the property from the Lease in 1980,
GPCC's subsequent construction of the Town Lift over this property was a trespass and
the district court erred in dismissing this claim.
B.

The Maintenance Building Trespass Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed.

GPCC does not dispute United Park's factual contention that its maintenance
building encroaches on United Park land which is not subject to the Ski Leases.39 As
United Park demonstrated, there is no evidence that United Park ever consented to this
trespass.

U.P. Br. at 72-3 & n.35, GPCC's argument and the district court's holding

that paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement requires United Park to permit GPCC to

Paragraph 14 of the Resort Area Lease as amended provides:
In the event of sale of a portion of the Leased Premises to Lessee or to a
third party pursuant to this Paragraph 14, this Lease shall be deemed
terminated with relation to the portion of the Leased Premises so sold by
Lessor, and said property shall for all purposes hereof be deemed to have
been deleted from the Leased Premises and shall no longer be subject to the
terms or conditions of this Lease as Amended.
(R. 5321).
39

United Park adequately supported this contention in its opposition to defendants'
motions for summary judgment. (R. 4849-52)
54

building facilities on United Park's land is wholly insupportable.40

Paragraph 19 only

requires United Park to grant easements reasonably necessary for ingress and egress and
to cooperate with GPCC when both parties are conducting operations on the same
property. The maintenance building trespass is not necessary for ingress or egress to
property sold by United Park to GPCC under the Land Agreement.

And the duty of

cooperation applies only where GPCC has a right to be conducting operations on a piece
of property. GPCC has no right to build facilities on land which United Park neither sold
nor leased to GPCC. Thus, the district court f s dismissal of this claim must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and those set forth in United Park's opening brief, the
judgment dismissing United Park's Amended Complaint must be reversed and the case
remanded for the completion of discovery and trial.
DATED this

of April, 1991.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

DAVID K. WATKISS
DAVID B. WATKISS
PERRIN R. LOVE
CAROLYN COX
Attorneys for
United Park City Mines Company

40

Paragraph 19 of the Land Agreement provides that
It is also understood and agreed that UPC will, upon request, grant to TMRC
such easements over its properties as may be reasonably necessary for
ingress and egress to and from any of the Subject Properties, provided that
the nature and duration of such easements shall be subject to the approval
of UPC and the use thereof shall be subject to such reasonable conditions
and restrictions as UPC shall impose.

(R. 4913).
55

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the | \ Q & d a y of April, 1991, four true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, postatge prepaid, addressed
to the following counsel:
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq.
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq,
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Merlin O. Baker, Esq.
Jonathan A. Dibble, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main S t r e e t
P . O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Michael F. Jones, Esq.
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South S t a t e S t r e e t
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

James A. Boevers, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Randy L. Dryer, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South S t a t e S t r e e t , Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Richard W. Giauque, Esq.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Donald N. Dirks, Esq.
DAVIS, POLK & WARDELL
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005

Howard L. Edwards, Esq.
515 South Flower S t r e e t
Los Angeles, California 90071

Gordon Strachan, Esq.
STRACHAN & STRACHAN
614 Main S t r e e t , Suite 401
Post Office Box 4485
Park City, Utah 84060-4485

Wendy A. Faber
ROYAL STREET
7620 Royal S t r e e t East
Suite No. 205
Park City, Utah 84060
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MUTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC. ("GPI"), PARK PROPERTIES, INC.
("PPI"), UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY
LAND COMPANY

("UPCM"), ROYAL STREET

("Land"), and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY

("GPCC"),

by and through their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows:
•1.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as the Trustee

and Escrow Agent

("The Agent"), pursuant to the Substituted Escrow

Agreement dated October 11, 1975, is authorized mfC^fltU^mmtiaB^ to,

uptA (p.nft«n nqottf; effUt macijpuKt" altcxruu</i
immediately disburse from escrow.the* following sums:
(a)

the sum of $1,512,240.27

the sum of $381,395.59

'

(plus any accrued

(plus any accrued

interest attributable thereto) to PPI; and
(c)

the sum of $984,087.33

(plus any accrued

interest attributable thereto) to UPCM.
2.

The accrued interest will be calculated as soon as

practical after the disbursement of the amounts set forth above.
The method of calculating the accrued interest and the amounts
proposed to be disbursed to each party will be circulated to the
parties for their approval in a form similar hereto.
3.

The Agent is authorized and directed to immediately

deliver from escrow the following instruments to the following
parties:
(a)

to GPCC those instruments identified as "o,"

"x," "bb" and "cc" in the Escrow Agreement; and

_!
f

pane£PJ^//f h

interest attributable thereto) to GPI;
(b)

•

G^\

(b)

to Land those instruments identified as " M V S

f,

uu" and wvv" in the Escrow Agreement.

4.

By the execution of this Mutual Consent and Hold Harmless

Agreement, and by receipt of ski lease rentals pursuant to this
Agreement, no party to this Agreement shall be deemed to have cert.fie
to the accuracy of ski lease revenue on which the ski lease rentals
were calculated.
5.

Each of the signatories hereto shall hold First Security

Bank of Utah, N.A., harmless from any and all claims arising from
the actions taken pursuant to this Agreement.
6.

Each of the signatories hereto represent they are

authorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of their respective
clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein.

This Agreement

may be signed in counterpart originals, which taken together shall
constitute a single document.
DATED this ^IfjVday of April, 1988.

Wendy
tfendy A. /Taber, Esq.
Attorney
attorney ^ror Land ^-%

Randy Ly^Dcryer, Esq.
Attorney for GPI and

Gordon Strachan, Esq.
Attorney for GPCC

tltateflflaJx-ltayga»d PtfUfp fV(n>dff(£5
Attorney for UPCM
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MOTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT

GREATER PROPERTIES, INC.
("PPI"),

( " G P I " ) , PARK PROPERTIES, INC.

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

("UPCM"),

ROYAL STREET

LAND COMPANY ( " L a n d " ) , and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY ("GPCC"), by
and t h r o u g h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l , h e r e b y a g r e e as
1.

F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of

Escrow Agent
Agreement
disburse

("the

dated

Agent"),

October

11,. 1 9 7 5 ,

U t a h , N . A . , as T r u s t e e and
to

is

the

Substituted

authorized

from e s c r o w , upon w r i t t e n r e q u e s t of

o r any p a r t of t h e f o l l o w i n g
(a)
Mines,

pursuant

said

sum

follows:

to

Escrow

immediately

the r e c i p i e n t ,

all

sums:

The sum

of

consisting

$167,410.80
of

the

t o United Park

sum

of

$56,772.39

City
as

u n d i s b u r s e d i n t e r e s t a c c r u e d t h r o u g h J u n e 3 0 , 1988 and t h e sum of.
$ 1 1 0 , 6 3 8 . 4 1 as

undisbursed

principal

received

by Agent

through

J u n e 3 0 , 1988;
(b)
the

sum of

The sum of $ 9 2 1 , 6 5 0 . 4 6 t o GPI, c o n s i s t i n g of

$124,839.19

as

undisbursed

interest

accrued

J u n e 3 0 , 1988 and t h e sum of $ 7 9 6 , 8 1 1 . 2 7 as u n d i s b u r s e d

through
principal

r e c e i v e d by Agent t h r o u g h J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 ; and
(c)
the

sum

of

The sum of $ 2 3 0 , 5 9 6 . 3 7 t o P P I , c o n s i s t i n g of

$31,393.55

as

undisbursed

interest

accrued

J u n e 3 0 , 1988 and t h e sum of $ 1 9 9 , 2 0 2 . 8 2 a s u n d i s b u r s e d

through
principal

r e c e i v e d by Agent t h r o u g h J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 .
2.

By t h e e x e c u t i o n

of

this

Mutual Consent and Hold

H a r m l e s s A g r e e m e n t , no p a r t y t o t h i s Agreement s h a l l be deemed t o
have c e r t i f i e d
r e n t a l s were

t o the a c c u r a c y of s k i
calculated.

l e a s e revenue on which

ski

3.

Each

of

the

signatories

hereto

shall

hold

the

Agent harmless from any and all claims arising from the actions
taken pursuant to this Agreement.
4.

Each of the signatories hereto represent they are

authorized to execute this Agreement o>n behalf of their respective clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein.
Agreement may be signed

This

in counterpart originals, which taken

together shall constitute a single document.

Dated:
RANDY L . DRYER, ESQ.
A t t o r n e y f o r GPI and PPI

Dated:

^K(*A ^ 7

(%&f$

MICHAEL E . HEYftEND , • ESQ.,
A t t o r n e y f o r UPCM

Dated:
GORDON STRACHAN, ESQ.
Attorney for GPCC

Dated:
KICHARD GiAUQUE, ESQ.
A t t o r n e y f o r Land
232:070888A
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MQTUAL CONSENT AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT
GREATER PROPERTIES, INC. ("GPI"), PARK PROPERTIES, INC.
("PPI"),

UNITED

LAND COMPANY

PARR CITY

MINES

COMPANY

("UPCM"),

("Land")/ and GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY

ROYAL

STREET

("GPCC"), by

and through their respective counsel, hereby agree as follows:
1.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee and

Escrow Agent
Agreement

("the

dated

Agent"),

October

pursuant

11,

to

the Substituted

1975, is authorized

to

Escrow

immediately

disburse from escrow, upon written request of the recipient, all
or any part of the following sums:
(a)
Mines,

said

sum

The sum

of $167,410.80

consisting

of

the

to United Park City

sum

of

$56,772.39

as

undisbursed interest accrued through June 30, 1988 and the sum of
$110,6 38.41

as

undisbursea

principal

received

by Agent

through

June 30, 1988;
(b)
the sum

The sum of $921,650.46 to GPI, consisting of

of $124,839.19

as

undisbursed

interest

accrued

through

June 30, 1988 and the sum of $796,811.27 as undisbursed principal
received by Agent through June 30, 1988; and
(c)
the

sum

of

The sum of $230,596.37 to PPI, consisting of

$31,393.55

as

undisbursed

interest

accrued

through

June 30, 1988 and the sum of $199,202.82 as undisbursed principal
received by Agent through June 30, 1988.
2.

By

the execution

of

this Mutual Consent

and Hold

Harmless Agreement, no party to this Agreement shall be deemed to
have certified

to the accuracy of ski lease revenue on which ski

rentals were calculated.

3.

Each

of

the

signatories

hereto

shall

hold

the

Agent harmless from any and all claims arising from the actions
taken pursuant to this Agreement.
4.

Each of the signatories hereto represent they are

authorized to execute this Agreement on behalf of their respective clients and to bind said clients to the terms herein.
Agreement

may be signed

in counterpart originals, which

This
taken

together shall constitute a single document.

Dated:

7/2?

0 \ • l^Wf^-i

ISS

RANDY Iy/t)RYER, ESQ
A t t d r n e k t o r GPI and

Dated.:
MICHAEL F. HEYREND, ESQ.
Attorney for UPCM

Dated:

Dated

*7

•

nnpnnu STRACHAN,
QTP&rwAM -pen
GORDON
ESQ.
Attorney for GPCC

: v—*~r
rAf/fr

232:070888A
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[Counsel Submitting Listed on Signature Page-]
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
STIPULATION
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; et al.,
Defendants.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Intervenor.

Civil No. C-86-3347
and
Civil No. C-86-8907
Judge Pat B. Brian

GREATER PROPERTIES, INC., a
Delaware corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a national banking
association; et al..
Defendants.

Plaintiff United Park City Mines Company (-United
Park-), and defendants Greater Park City Company (-GPCC*),
Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. (*AMOT-), Morgan Guaranty and

li 5 " f**' #fl(

• :T;.«-r

Trust Company of New York (-Morgan"), Fidelity Bank of
Philadelphia (-Fidelity-), Greater Properties, Inc. (-GPI-),
Park Properties, Inc. (-PPI-), and First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. (-First Security-) hereby stipulate as follows:
1.

On December 31, 1990, GPCC made final payment to

United Park on the Renewal Promissory Note, and requested that
United Park release the Mortgage dated October 11, 1975, which
Mortgage was executed to secure payment of the Renewal
Promissory Note.
2.

First Security, as the Trustee and Escrow Agent

under the Substituted Escrow Agreement dated October 11, 1975,
is authorized and directed by the parties hereto to promptly
(1) deliver to GPCC the Renewal Promissory Note marked -Paid in
Full- and (2) disburse to United Park those monies paid to the
Escrow Agent by GPCC on December 31, 1990 under the terms of
that certain Renewal Promissory Note dated October 11, 1975,
and all accrued interest thereon.
3.

United Park hereby agrees to execute a Release of

Mortgage which will release the Mortgage dated October 11, 1975
(identified as instrument (h) in the Substituted Escrow
Agreement).
4.

By execution of this Stipulation, no party shall

be deemed to have waived any claims, or defenses thereto, it
may have in this litigation.

-2-

5-

The parties further acknowledge and agree:
a.

That the defendants have argued and will

continue to argue that United Park's acceptance of escrow
monies and release of instruments of title, among other things,
has constituted and will constitute a waiver of certain claims
asserted by United Park in the above-captioned litigation*
b.

That United Park has argued and will

continue to argue that no such waiver has occurred or will
occur; and
c.

That it is the intent of the parties that

the execution of this Stipulation shall have no effect on their
respective positions as refej££Jiced above,
DATED this ^ V

' day of January, 1991,

STRACHAN & STRACHAN
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
DAVIS POLK & WARDELL

itf .j>,

ftborneys for Defendants
greater Park City Company
and Alpine Meadows of
Tahoe, Inc.

AttoVney^Afor Defend^rfitis
Greader (properties, lire.
Park Properties, Inc.,
Morgan Guaranty & Trust
Company of New York,
Fidelity Bank of
Philadelphia

WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for United Park
City Mines Company

Attorneys for First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A,

u, •
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

-7^"

I hereby certify that, on the (yvft

day of January,

1991, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION to the following:
David K. Watkiss
David B. Watkiss
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2171
Richard W. Giauque
Wendy A. Faber
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Richard D. Burbidge
Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, #2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael F. Jones
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
Suite 1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Randy L. Dryer
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Merlin O. Baker
Jonathan A. Dibble
Keith A. Kelly
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

-4-

Gordon Strachan, Esq.
STRACHAN & STRACHAN
614 Main Street, Suite 401
P.O. Box 4485
Park City, Utah 84060-4485
Donald N. Dirks
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, New York 10005
Howard L. Edwards, Esq.
515 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90071

8241G
011491
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CONVEYANCE OF WATER RIGHTS
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
qualified to do business in the State of Utah, Grantor, hereby
grants and conveys to GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a Utah corporation, Grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other
valuable considerations, all of the right, title and interest of
Grantor in the right of use in and to the following identified
and described water and water rights, to-wit:

Description and Location

Utah State Engineer's
Filing Number

Group I
Spiro Tunnel, diverted at a point
1,950 feet N and 1,680 feet W
of the SE corner of Section 8,
T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM

#8654
Underground Water
Claim (35-2708)

Group II
Ontario Drain Tunnel, diverted
at a point which bears S 46°52'
W 2,398.5 feet from the NE corner
of Section 24, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM
Lady Morgan Spring,
a point which bears
2,715 feet from the
corner, Section 29,
R 4 E, SLM
Hannauer Spring
at a point N 40
feet from the S
Section 20, T 2

#15,409
Underground Water
Claim (55-3365)

diverted at
S 4°2' E
N quarter
T 2 S,

& Tunnel, diverted
feet and W 450
quarter corner,
S, R 4 E. SLM

#8655
Underground Water
Claim (35-2709)

Mountain Spring Tunnel (Shadow
Lake) Spring 6c Tunnel, diverted
at a point N 600 feet and E 260
feet of the W quarter corner,
Section 30, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM

#8656
Underground Water
Claim (35-2710)

Newpci_ ::i'nc Tunnel, diverted at
a point N 800 feet and 300 feet
E of the W quarter corner of
Section 20, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM

#8657
Underground Water
Claim (35-2711)

Description and Location

Utah State Engineer's
Filing Number

California Mine Tunnel, diverted
at a point N 100 feet and West
970 feet from the S quarter corner
of Section 19,. T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM

#8658
Underground Water
Claim (35-2712)

Jeanette or Thaynes Tunnel, S 280
feet and E 800 feet of the E
quarter corner. Section 25,
T 2 S, R 3 E, SLM

#8659
Underground Water
Claim (35-2713)

Alliance Tunnel, diverted at a
point N 1,070 feet and E 1,270
feet from the SW corner, Section
21, T 2 S, R 4 E, SLM

#8660
Underground Water
Claim (35-2714)

Blood's or Judge Lake, diverted at:
a point which bears N 19°1' E
654.1 feet from the E quarter
corner of Section 36, T 2 S,
R 4 E, SLM

#187
Diligence Claim
(55-1280)

Keetley Spring, diverted at a
point which bears S 37°58' W
741 feet from the NE corner,
Section 23, T 2 S, R 4 E. SLM

#185
Diligence Claim
(55-1279)

Excepting and reserving unto Grantor the prior right
to use, or to lease or grant to others the right to use,
for mining, milling and related ptirposes, the first
twenty-eight hundred and fifty (2,850)^gallons per minute
from the aggregate water yield of the water and water
rights identified and described in Group II above.
Grantor covenants and agrees that it will hereafter
execute, without warranty, and deliver to Grantee such further
instruments of assignment or conveyance, or furnish such other
instruments from its records as it may possess and which may be
required by the State Engineer of Utah to complete transfer of
the water and water rights hereinabove identified from Grantor
to Grantee, subject always, however, to the exception and reservation to Grantor, i*-* 1^«sees and assigns, of the water and water
rights as herein set forth.
The officers who sign this conveyance hereby certify

-2-

that this conveyance and the transfer represented hereby were
duly authorized under resolutions duly adopted by the Board of
Directors of each of the Grantors at lawful meetings duly held
and attended by quorums.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, United Park City Mines Company,
Grantor, as aforesaid, has caused this instrument to be signed
by its duly authorized officers with its corporate seal affixed
this 10th

day of October

1975.

2D PARK CITY MINES COMPANY

ATTEST:

By
^n ^-

President

secretary
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:

SS.

On this /p*~ day of
flffr/**.
1975, personally
appeared before me MILES P. R0MNEi7 who, being by me duly sworn,
did say that he is the President of UNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, and that the within and foregoing
Conveyance of Water Rights was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and
said MILES P. ROMNEY duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of
said corporation.
*\^<L4^r~W

tfocary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
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INVOICE

In Account With

Date

3 19 75

invoice No.

Midway irrigation Co.

Your Order No.

Midway, Utah 8UOU9

oi oo ooo 113 oia 872

Water b i l l i n g on the Ontario Daly # 2

Tunnel f o r

3.13 c f s G$60 per CFS f o r 1S7U see
Overflow and storage on Ontario Lakes for 197U

attached

$187.80
1.00

$188.80

XA06848
Terms Net. No Discount

A Subsidiary of Greater Park City Company

BOK 781 • F'

X <Jliy, u m i l 5 4 u o u • r u u u c ^

^--~ ~ —

INVOICE
In Account With

Date
Invoice
Your Order No.

is

is

re i i i f o r s r y a u t h a t

tiio fallovria;*- i s

2 Shares; a f Midw2.y I r r i g a t i o n

S a l a a c e Due

5-

au3:

District

i:/76

10.00

TERMS: NET, due upon receipt odf billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid
past-due balance, at a monthly rate of 1% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE

OP 18 PERCENT.

£ p —Q32<16
G

PC-

18679

Box 781, t fc City; Vtab 8 4 6 6 b - Phone $

64-9-81I1

INVOICE

.Your Order Na

^THRSiESL NET£xfi» t g ^ . w c ^ ^

unpaid1

GPC- 18680

:

*f&£

INVOICE

in Account With

Date

•16-77

Invoice
... z v * * ~ 3r.

his

«*•* 3*- -r

Your Order No.

i s t.a iafcrrxr yau?* raa:t^ t h e f o l l o w i n g i s * duo ;
j^SItareSf a F iiidiMky D e r i v a t i o n D i s t r i c t
3 a l a n e * Due:

l*i76

Us.ao

TERMS: NET, doe npo» receipt of billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid
past-doe balance, at a monthly rat* of 1% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE
OF i a PERCENT-

<--£&-m**-

B<xt78I, K w * Cttyt Utah 8 4 0 6 0 • Phone {fi J 649-8111

INVOICE
Date

m Account Wftfr

:-25-77

invoice
Your Order No.

.:iis i s

t o ia-foriX'/ottr t l t a r c?ie- f a l i a ^ i n r i s

duo:

2 Skaresh Mitfw-ay I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t

3*aXaace S u e

li?76

S^OO

TERMS: NET,, dua upon receipt of biffing; A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid
past-due balance^ at a monthly rate of V/2 percent per month; this represents an ANNUAfeRMnR^ M Q
OF 18 PERCENT.
^____j(Si3?H^3^
:

,

„

GPC- 19632

BOK7HU f ^rK luiiy, utcuA

INVOICE

In Account With
j.:." . or - - :cr-vjt

Date
invoice

^rivo

Your Order No.

h i s is

t o iJiiTarrr yotr o f t h e f o l l o w i n g

billing?

I LIZ S h a r e * af" Midway I r r i g a t i o n a i s t r i c t
Ea^Lsuice tftn*

19 76

m.sa

TERMS: NET,, due upon receipt of billing. A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid
past-due balance,, at a monthly rate of 1 M> percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE

OF 18 PERCENT.

^
6PC-

0325 tT

18683

=

B 0 K 7 8 T , 2. * City; U t a h 8 4 0 6 0 • P h o n e f£ J. 64-9-8111

INVOICE

Date

in Account with

Invoice
Your Order No.

This i s

u x , b i I L x«fc. f a r r t k a

faELaxixig::

J S h a r e s * j^r\ttiLJar&F I r r i j r t t i G r * D i s t r i c t

b a l a n c e - Qua

1P75

tf;3-.oe

TERMS: NET; due upon receipt of biffing* A FINANCE CHARGE is assessable on the unpaid
past-due balance, a t a monthly rate of t% percent per month; this represents an ANNUAL RATE

0FiapERCENr

-

r——r^roaa^:
RPC-

18684

ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY
P. O . BOX

889

1700 PARK A V E N U E
PARK CITY r U T A H

84060

W I L L I A M A. PRINCE

TELEPHONE

Vice President -Controller

801/649-8585

August 21, 1980

Ms. Vicki Ferrante
Park City Ski Corp.
P. 0. Box 39
Park City, UT 84060
Dear Vicki:
We did not receive a copy of the billing to LeGrande Parsons (Ontario
Tunnel) and Midway Irrigation Company for the current year.
Kindly send us a copy of your latest billings.
Many thanks.
Yours truly,

William A. Prince
WAP:Imp

GfP 0 2 0 4 2
6PC-

IZitV

c
c

Royal Street Land Ci
1700 Park Avenue, S
P. 0 . Box 889
Park City, Utah 84060

Ms. Vicki Ferrante
Park City Ski Corp,
P. 0. Box 39
Park City, UT 84060

ROYAL STREET LAND COMPANY
P. O. BOX 880
1700 PARK AVENUE
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060
TELEPHONE
801/649-8585

WILLIAM A. PRINCE
Vice PTMidtnt-Controltor

September 22, 1980

Ms. Vicki Ferrante
Park City Ski Corp.
P. 0. Box 39
Park City, UT 84060
Dear Vicki:
Thank you for the current year billings for LeGrande Parsons (Ontario
Tunnel) and Midway Irrigation Company which I received today.
Yours truly,

William A. Prince
Imp

$P 02041
GPC-

136in

